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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 In the twentieth century, the nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico relied on their 
confederate council—the All Indian Pueblo Council (AIPC)—to negotiate the demands 
of the American political system. By organizing around a single, historic body, the 
Pueblos were able to shield much of their tradition, secure a degree of political and 
educational autonomy, protect their water rights, and increase their economic 
development. The leaders of the AIPC were on the front line in negotiating with federal 
and state authorities, and became adept at negotiating political networks to secure Pueblo 
interests. Despite the historic conflicts within the Pueblos, the actions of the AIPC during 
the twentieth century demonstrate that the Pueblos were keen to unite around a political 
confederation, representing all Pueblos, when their joint interests were threatened. 
Further, the AIPC became the single organization Pueblo people and tribal councils relied 
on to protect, bolster, and even increase the sovereignty of the Pueblos, amidst a larger 
Native sovereignty movement in the United States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On 30 January 2007, Pueblo governors gathered at Santo Domingo Pueblo to 
renew the bonds of friendship and political confederacy among New Mexico’s nineteen 
Pueblos. A large contingent of female attendees, representing multiple generations, 
cooked red chile, tamales, green chile stew, and Pueblo oven bread for a crowd of over 
three hundred spectators—the largest remembered attendance for the ceremony. 
Witnesses stood by to observe each of the governors sworn into his position as an officer 
of the Pueblos’ confederate council, the All Indian Pueblo Council (AIPC).1 Each of the 
nineteen governors repeated the time-worn tradition of standing, expressing his 
appreciation for the unity of the Pueblos, or saying a prayer in his native tongue. And 
while in the early twenty-first century the AIPC has become a complex modern 
organization, on this day the governors mostly refrained from discussing the ins and outs 
of Pueblo politics. Instead, the council came together to remember the rich heritage of the 
AIPC, which stretches back four hundred years. The council’s newly elected chairman, 
Joe Garcia from Ohkay Owingeh Pueblo, reiterated the purpose of the AIPC. “The All 
Indian Pueblo Council,” he said “is about finding solutions. . . . We are looking forward 
to uniting together to come to these solutions.”2
 In the twentieth century, the nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico relied on the AIPC 
to conduct negotiations and represent Pueblo interests to the outside world. Between the 
 
1 The All Indian Pueblo Council (AIPC) was known before 1965 as the All Pueblo 
Council (APC). The organization is one and the same. The difference in name indicates 
only the signing of the organization’s constitution in 1965. Thus I use the title 
interchangeably, dependent on the time frame in question. 
2 “Inaugural Feast,” Santa Fe New Mexican, 30 January 2007, C-1. 
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1920s and the mid 1970s, in particular, the AIPC became the most important element of 
Pueblo government when dealing with external issues. The confederate council 
developed a pragmatic governance of external Pueblo issues while fighting to protect 
Pueblo tradition. Occasionally the AIPC’s defiance to protect their sovereignty was 
perceived as militancy, as was the case when it fought to negotiate a favorable outcome 
to the Pueblo land controversy in the 1920s. At other times, the AIPC struggled to sustain 
momentum when campaigning to protect Pueblo sovereignty during the stifling federal 
policies of the mid-century. Indeed the activity of the AIPC was frequently tempered by 
federal aggression toward tribal structures until the council began administering its own 
programs in the 1960s. The AIPC followed a philosophy termed by Pueblo historian Joe 
Sando, as “cooperation for progress,” in which Pueblo leaders negotiated pragmatically 
the demands of twentieth-century America with non-Indians in order to maintain and 
protect tradition.3
 During the twentieth century the Pueblos faced a vast array of issues that required 
the attention of the AIPC. In the 1920s, the Pueblos’ land base faced destruction at the 
hands of Congress. The AIPC response to this issue led to a sustained period during 
which non-Indians and progressive Pueblos questioned the legitimacy of the AIPC to 
negotiate on behalf of all Pueblos. John Collier’s tribal-friendly reign as federal Indian 
commissioner later encouraged a greater level of political activism from the AIPC, which 
began to negotiate the local terms of the Pueblos’ water rights. During the midcentury, 
federal policies designed to destroy all tribal entities suffocated the activism of the 
council. And in the 1960s, during the rush for self-determination, the AIPC began to 
 
3 Joe Sando, The Pueblo Indians (San Francisco, Calif.: The Indian Historian Press, 
1976), 168. 
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negotiate the Pueblos’ economic and educational independence, while asserting the 
sovereign right of the Pueblos to determine their own futures.  
 Historians have tended to focus on the Pueblo revolt of 1680 as the sole instance 
of solidarity among the nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico. And although Pueblo 
communities are internally and externally divergent, the historic existence of the AIPC 
demonstrates that inter-Pueblo cooperation is nowhere near as unusual as historians have 
previously suggested. In fact, the inter-Pueblo unity evident in the AIPC’s actions in the 
twentieth century illustrates a culture of cooperation among New Mexico’s nineteen 
Pueblos, which, despite its frays, is far deeper than has previously been suggested. The 
issues facing the Pueblos continually changed, but the function of the AIPC was always 
to provide a united face to the outside world that, by acting with external strength, 
protected the traditional elements of Pueblo government, internally. Regardless of the 
battleground, the AIPC conceived of its twentieth-century struggles around a single issue: 
the historic independence of Pueblo communities and their continuing sovereign right to 
self-government. 
 All current nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico are politically autonomous societies 
that speak different languages, practice distinct religions, and observe unique cultures. 
Within most Pueblos, however, there have historically been two systems of government. 
In one, the cacique heads the traditional system. During the sixteenth-century conquest of 
New Mexico, Spanish leaders coined the word “cacique,” meaning chief, or king, when 
identifying the leader of each Pueblo. Along with the war chief and his assistants, the 
cacique is responsible for all theocratic matters within Pueblo society. In the traditional 
system, each position is held for life. After the Spaniards had established a presence in 
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northern New Spain, they introduced a second system of government to the Pueblos that 
was answerable to the crown. The village governor stands at the helm of this system. The 
governor is in charge of secular, normally external, matters for the Pueblo he serves. The 
Spaniards awarded each Pueblo a silver-headed cane, to be handed to the governor 
elected each year, normally at the new year, as a symbol of his authority to represent that 
Pueblo. Over time the position of governor was “converted by the Pueblos into an 
effective bulwark against intrusion by foreigners.” Today, governors continue to provide 
a face to the outside world for each Pueblo. The cacique and his staff have traditionally 
selected the governor each year, but today at Isleta, Laguna, Pojoaque, San Ildefonso, 
Santa Clara, and Zuni Pueblos, the governor is elected by popular vote.4
There is also a third system of government that exists between Pueblos: the AIPC, 
or the “political arm of the Pueblos.” The AIPC has functioned as a “confederation of 19 
autonomous pueblo governments, providing a united voice for dealing with other 
governmental agencies.”5 The AIPC consists of nineteen representatives; the governor of 
each Pueblo is automatically appointed to the AIPC; and the nineteen governors have one 
vote each to appoint the chairman, vice chairman, and secretary of the council every two 
years. Due to the caciques’ selection of the governors in their respective Pueblos, the 
traditional elders of each Pueblo maintain a connection to the council.6 The AIPC, then, 
has no power to govern the internal affairs of individual Pueblo communities. Instead, the 
 
4 For a fuller discussion of the political structure of the Pueblos, see Joe Sando, Pueblo 
Nations: Eight Centuries of Pueblo Indian History (Santa Fe, N.Mex.: Clear Light 
Publishers, 1992), 13–18.  
5 All Indian Pueblo Council Narrative, n.d., untitled folder, box 5, All Indian Pueblo 
Council Papers, Pueblo Archives, Indian Pueblo Cultural Center, Albuquerque, New 
Mexico [hereafter AIPC Papers-IPCC]. 
6 For the AIPC constitution signed 16 October 1965, refer to Sando, Pueblo Nations, 264. 
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council has historically functioned as a single inter-Pueblo representative body that deals 
with external issues affecting all Pueblos.  
 The council has been a part of the political structure of Pueblo life since perhaps 
as early as the 1300s. Joe Sando states that, similarly to the Iroquois League, the All 
Indian Pueblo Council is one of the oldest confederate governments in North America.7 
He suggests that the arrival of the Athabaskans in the Southwest compelled a measure of 
unity between the Pueblos, and this unity gradually evolved into the formal organization 
of today.8 Before the Spanish settled in New Mexico, there were at least thirty-five (and 
probably many more) individual Pueblo villages, populated by many tens of thousands of 
men and women.9 According to Sando, a mutual Pueblo need to work in unison to fend 
off the newly arrived raiders led to the formation of the council. The AIPC went on to act 
also as an unofficial inter-Pueblo jury, resolving disputes when there was a problem in 
any village.10 Sando suggests that the first evidence of the council’s existence can be 
traced to July 1598, when thirty-eight leaders met at Santo Domingo Pueblo, gave Juan 
de Oñate permission to settle on the Rio Grande, and swore allegiance to the Spanish 
throne. Soon after, Oñate established a settlement near San Juan.11
 
7 Sando, Pueblo Nations, 263. 
8 Archaeologist David Brugge has suggested that by 1300, the Apacheans were on the 
northern periphery of the Southwest area. See David Brugge, “Navajo Prehistory and 
History to 1850,” in Southwest, ed. Alfonso Ortiz, vol. 10 of Handbook of North 
American Indians, ed. William C. Sturtevant, 20 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian 
Institution, 1983), 490. 
9 For a more full discussion on the demographics of the Pueblos before contact, and for 
more detailed numbers, see Albert H. Schroeder, “Pueblos Abandoned in Historic 
Times,” in Southwest, ed. Alfonso Ortiz, vol. 9 of Handbook of North American Indians, 
ed. William C. Sturtevant, 20 vols. (Washington, D. C.,: Smithsonian Institution, 1979). 
10 Sando, Pueblo Nations, 263. 
11 Sando, Pueblo Indians, 210–11. 
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 The precise history of the AIPC before the twentieth century is uncertain. A 
councilman of Santo Domingo in the late twentieth century explained, “the details of the 
history are so sacred, they have been kept a secret. The heart of the AIPC is buried at 
Santo Domingo Pueblo, depicting a bone which lies across the state of New Mexico.”12 
While there are many moments that can be pointed to as the beginning of the AIPC, as 
time passed and the twentieth century neared, the structure of the council became 
increasingly formal. Certainly, the Pueblos came together politically long before the 
Bursum bill struggle of 1922.  
 Despite the guarded history of the AIPC, late-nineteenth-century AIPC action 
indicates the role that the council fulfilled before the twentieth century. In 1889, for 
example, the Pueblos suffered many deaths at the hands of an influenza outbreak 
originating in Russia. The Pueblos vowed that in future they would meet in times of 
crisis, and more when necessary, to help one another.13 Pablo Abeita of Isleta, who was 
born in 1871, remembered that the AIPC was “already in force” when he was a child. 
“The Indians would meet at the request or at the asking of any Pueblo for matters 
pertaining to the welfare of the Pueblo Indians,” he noted. Indeed, Abeita was a member 
of the council by the age of eighteen, and he experienced a tumultuous conflict in 1894. 
At this time the AIPC intervened in a land dispute between San Felipe and Santo 
Domingo Pueblos. Described as a “warpath” by Abeita, the conflict resulted in some 
deaths. The AIPC met at San Felipe to mediate the dispute, and ordered San Felipe to pay 
 
12 Quoted in Sally Hyer, “Remembering Santa Fe Indian School, 1890–1990” (Phd diss., 
University of New Mexico, 1994), 285. 
13 “The All-Pueblo Council: A Veteran Confederation,” folder 23, box 4, Sophie D. 
Aberle Papers, 1913–1987, MSS 509 BC, Center for Southwest Research, University 
Libraries, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque [hereafter Aberle Papers, CSWR]. 
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two hundred dollars in damages to Santo Domingo. Abeita remembers that the event 
brought the Pueblos closer together than they had been, and they vowed to be more 
responsive toward one another in the future.14
There is a surprising lack of historical literature on the nineteen Pueblos of New 
Mexico and their confederate council in the twentieth century.15 Historians such as J. 
Manuel Espinosa, Ramón A. Gutiérrez, John Kessell, and Carroll L. Riley have 
successfully illuminated Pueblo history by focusing on the rich dynamics of Spanish-
Pueblo relations from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. In this historiography, the 
Pueblo Revolt of 1680 has acted as a massive historical watershed.16 The concentration 
of research on Spanish-Pueblo relations, however, has meant that Pueblo history after the 
establishment of U.S. power in New Mexico in 1848 is quite sparse. Some historians 
have tackled questions over the legal status of the Pueblos under the United States in the 
nineteenth century.17 Yet, twentieth-century political history, if written at all, has rarely 
been told from the Pueblos’ perspective. Only Joe Sando of Jemez Pueblo and James 
 
14 See Pablo Abeita’s statement in All Pueblo Council meeting minutes, September 1929, 
Santo Domingo, p. 9, reel 8, microfilm, John Collier Papers [hereafter Collier Papers]; 
and “The All-Pueblo Council: A Veteran Confederation.” 
15 There is, however, an abundance of anthropological studies on the Pueblos. For 
example see Edward Dozier, The Pueblo Indians of North America (1970; repr., Prospect 
Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1983); or Ortiz, ed., Southwest.  
16 Most recently, J. Manuel Espinosa, The Pueblo Indian Revolt of 1696 and the 
Franciscan Missions in New Mexico: Letters of the Missionaries and Related Documents 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988); Ramón A. Gutiérrez, When Jesus Came, 
the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500–
1846 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991); John Kessell, Pueblos, 
Spaniards, and the Kingdom of New Mexico (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
2008); and Caroll L. Riley, The Kachina and the Cross: Indians and Spaniards in the 
Early Southwest (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1999). 
17 See, for example, Deborah A. Rosen, “Pueblo Indians and Citizenship in Territorial 
New Mexico,” New Mexico Historical Review 78 (winter 2003): 1–28. 
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Vlasich have provided Pueblo perspective in the twentieth century by focusing 
respectively on cultural and agricultural factors.18
 This is not to say that historians have ignored the Pueblo story altogether in the 
twentieth century. In fact, elements of the twentieth century have been covered in quite 
extraordinary depth. A few historians have subjected the Bursum bill, the Pueblo Lands 
Board Act, and the political context of these measures to great scrutiny. Yet within their 
examination of the land battle, historians have paid scant attention to the Pueblo people 
who helped determine their own futures.19 Instead, they have focused on Stella Atwood 
and the General Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC), John Collier and the American 
Indian Defense Association (AIDA), the political and artistic circles in Santa Fe and 
Taos, or the politicians who imposed the Bursum bill on New Mexico’s nineteen 
Pueblos.20 Despite the tendency of historians to focus on the white men and women of 
non-Indian organizations—illuminating a rich history on wider America at this time—the 
land struggle acutely affected local Pueblo communities. Within and between these 
 
18 Sando, Pueblo Nations; Joe Sando, Pueblo Profiles: Cultural Identity through 
Centuries of Change (Santa Fe, N.Mex.: Clear Light Publishers, 1998); and James A. 
Vlasich, Pueblo Indian Agriculture (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 
2005). 
19 Only Joe Sando places the Indians at the center of this picture. See Sando, Pueblo 
Profiles and Sando, Pueblo Nations. 
20 See, for example, Karin L. Huebner, “An Unexpected Alliance: Stella Atwood, the 
California Clubwomen, John Collier, and the Indians of the Southwest, 1917–1934,” 
Pacific Historical Review 78 (August 2009): 337–366; Lawrence C. Kelly, The Assault 
on Assimilation: John Collier and the Origins of Indian Policy Reform (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1983); Arrell Morgan Gibson, The Santa Fe and Taos 
Colonies: Age of the Muses, 1900–1942 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983); 
and Kenneth R. Philp, “Albert B. Fall and the Protest from the Pueblos, 1921-23,” 
Arizona and the West 12 (Autumn 1970): 237–254. Another key moment of historical 
focus has been the return of Taos Blue Lake to Taos Pueblo. See, for example, Andrew 
Graybill, “Strong on the Merits and Powerfully Symbolic”: The Return of  Blue Lake to 
Taos Pueblo,” New Mexico Historical Review 76 (April 2001): 125–160. 
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communities, the Pueblos organized around the AIPC, a body that historians have 
typically mentioned only in passing.21 Yet the AIPC and its leaders were crucial to the 
outcome of this struggle. Only Tisa Wenger, a historian of religious history, has begun to 
remedy the lack of Pueblo perspective during this critical time in her analysis of the 
Pueblo fight for religious freedom in the 1920s.22
 Historians Francis Paul Prucha, Elmer Rusco, and Edward Spicer have incorrectly 
suggested that the Bursum bill coalition formed in 1922 “led to the establishment of the 
All-Pueblo Council.”23 According to Rusco, “Inter-Pueblo cooperation goes all the way 
back to the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, and there had been irregular and ad hoc meetings of 
representatives of all or most Pueblos for some time before the 1920s.”24 These informal 
gatherings, however, were likely pre-arranged AIPC meetings that had traditionally met 
“each month, since time immemorial.”25 Despite these inaccuracies, Prucha, Rusco, and 
Spicer do highlight an important moment of cooperation between all nineteen Pueblos 
and outside organizations in twentieth-century Pueblo history. For this moment became 
 
21 Historians have tended to mention the AIPC as a political body established by John 
Collier in 1922. See, for example, Lawrence C. Kelly, “John Collier and the Pueblo 
Lands Board Act,” New Mexico Historical Review 58 (January 1983): 6. 
22 Tisa Joy Wenger, We Have a Religion: The 1920s Pueblo Indian Dance Controversy 
and American Religious Freedom (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 
2009). 
23 Elmer Rusco, A Fateful Time: The Background and Legislative History of the Indian 
Reorganization Act (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2000), 23–24; Francis Paul 
Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians, 2 
vols., combined and unabridged (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 799; and 
Edward Spicer, Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States 
on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533–1960 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1967), 
173.  
24 Rusco, A Fateful Time, 23–24. 
25 Benny Atencio, U.S. House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee 
on Indian Affairs, Rights of Members of Indian Tribes: Hearings on H.R. 15419 and 
Related Bills, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 50. 
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formative for the AIPC in many ways, providing Pueblo leaders with the tools required to 
continue negotiating Pueblo sovereignty for many decades. 
 Despite this focus on the political wranglings of the Bursum bill, historians have 
little considered the events from the passage of the Pueblo Lands Board Act, in 1924, to 
and including the Indian Reorganization Act, in 1934, through the final settlements of the 
Pueblo Lands Board (PLB) in 1938. An analysis of this time frame demonstrates that the 
Pueblos’ land and water struggles did not end with the legislation of the Pueblo Lands 
Board Act. Certainly the Bursum-bill struggle was formative for the AIPC. In particular, 
the relationship the APC formed with soon-to-be federal Indian commissioner John 
Collier—described by Vine Deloria Jr. as the first non-Indian to “understand, appreciate, 
articulate, and fight zealously” for Indian tradition—became vital to the Pueblos land- 
and water-based future.26 In many ways the defeat of the Bursum bill was only the 
beginning of the Pueblos’ story and the role of the AIPC in twentieth-century New 
Mexico. The Pueblos’ land and water struggles continued into the 1930s and beyond, and 
necessitated that the APC grow as a representative body. Similarly, because of the federal 
government’s campaign to end tribal sovereignty in the mid-century, historians have 
given almost no consideration to the actions of the Pueblos at this time. Vlasich does 
cover this period in his work on Pueblo agriculture, yet he gives little scope to the 
political ramifications of this difficult time period. 
 While the majority of Native American political histories have been written from 
the perspective of the federal government, the mid-to-late twentieth century has recently 
 
26 Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of 
American Indian Sovereignty, (1984; repr. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), 41. 
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been scrutinized from a different perspective.27 More recently scholars of Native history 
have started to focus on twentieth-century events, emphasizing activist Red Power 
movements since World War II. Authors such as Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Warrior 
have commonly argued that Red Power movements led by American Indian Movement 
(AIM) after the Alcatraz occupation of 1969–1971 attained from the federal government 
self-determination for Native communities.28 There is, however, a growing body of 
literature that diverges from the dominant discourse of this period. Charles Wilkinson’s 
Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations (2005) and Daniel Cobb’s Native 
Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty (2008) have very recently 
argued that from the 1950s onward, Native tribes and their political leaders orchestrated a 
modern Native American movement for tribal sovereignty and political self-
determination.29  
 When the AIPC is viewed alongside what Wilkinson describes as a “modern tribal 
sovereignty movement” in the twentieth century, the historical significance of the AIPC 
 
27 For an overview of Native American federal policy, see Prucha, The Great Father. For 
twentieth-century federal Indian policy, see Kenneth R. Philp, foreword by Francis Paul 
Prucha, John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, 1920-1954 (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 1977); Deloria Jr. and Lytle, The Nations Within; and Vine Deloria Jr., 
ed., American Indian Policy in the Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1985). 
28 For example see Troy Johnson, The Occupation of Alcatraz: Indian Self-Determination 
and the Rise of Indian Activism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996); and Paul 
Chaat Smith and Robert Warrior, Like A Hurricane: The Indian Movement from Alcatraz 
to Wounded Knee (New York: New Press, 1996). 
29 Daniel M. Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008); Daniel Cobb and Loretta Fowler, eds., 
Beyond Red Power: American Indian Politics and Activism Since 1900 (Santa Fe, 
N.Mex.: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007); Charles Wilkinson, Blood 
Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2005). 
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becomes apparent.30 The AIPC can be understood in a context where “tribal members 
might discuss their predicaments, assess the alternatives offered by both traditional and 
innovative political structures, and chart a course of action for the future.”31 Wilkinson 
and other scholars have usually pointed to the National Congress of American Indians, 
established in 1944, as the root of this movement. The AIPC narrative, however, suggests 
that the Pueblos’ campaign for tribal sovereignty began far earlier. In Beyond Red Power: 
American Indian Politics and Activism since 1900, Daniel M. Cobb and Loretta Fowler 
show that Native activism was common from the beginning of the twentieth century. 
From the 1920s onward, I argue, the AIPC conceived of battles over land, water, and 
political authority as attacks on the sovereignty of the Pueblos. Further, the AIPC steadily 
led a campaign with a consistent message to protect Pueblo sovereignty from the 1920s to 
the 1970s.  
 Ultimately, the story of the AIPC, as a modern Native American institution 
fighting for Pueblo sovereignty, remains to be written. This work offers a beginning to 
writing that history by examining how the AIPC functioned during the twentieth century 
and aims to fill in some gaps in Pueblo history during this period. It pays particular 
attention to the development of the institution itself, to its chairmen during the crucial 
period of the mid to late twentieth century, to its interactions with federal institutions, and 
to the council-sponsored programs that enlarged the self-determination of Pueblo 
communities. I conceive of the AIPC as a Native American community or “active node in 
 
30 Wilkinson, Blood Struggle, xiv. 
31 Frederick E. Hoxie, “Missing the Point: Academic Experts and American Indian 
Politics,” in Beyond Red Power: American Indian Politics and Activism Since 1900, ed. 
Daniel Cobb and Loretta Fowler (Santa Fe, N.Mex.: School for Advanced Research 
Press, 2007), 26. See also, Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America. 
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a network of assessment, thought, and action.” The narrative focuses on the role of the 
leaders—and particularly the chairman—of the AIPC during this time because, as 
Frederick Hoxie astutely observes, Native political leaders during the twentieth century 
should be considered activists. Due to the unique position of tribes within America, these 
leaders “could not avoid acting within the boundaries of American political life.” As was 
the case elsewhere across Indian Country, AIPC leaders waged campaigns “to support the 
interests of indigenous communities, but their successes were won through interaction 
with the legal institutions of the United States.”32 As leaders of a prominent outward-
facing indigenous institution, AIPC chairmen were on the front line of the modern tribal 
sovereignty movement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 Hoxie, “Missing the Point,” 30. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The All Pueblo Council’s Formative Years: Pueblo Land Rights, Religious Freedom, 
and Political Autonomy in the 1920s 
 
 On an early February morning in 1921, on the outskirts of Tesuque Pueblo, New 
Mexico, before the sun had fully risen over the snow-capped Sangre de Cristo Mountains 
to the east, over twenty-five men marched toward the fenced boundary of a nearby 
rancher’s land. On arrival, encouraged by the defiance and leadership of their twenty-
five-year-old lieutenant governor, Martin Vigil, the men from the Tewa Pueblo began 
tearing down the fencing and uprooting the fence posts that demarcated the boundary of 
the E. D. Newman Ranch. Newman soon arrived at the scene and, smiling wryly at Vigil, 
remarked, “you meant what you said.” “Yes,” Vigil replied, “I’m not talking behind a 
bush, I’m telling you right off.”33
 A few weeks earlier, Vigil had approached Newman on his ranch while he was 
installing a new fence across land that the members of Tesuque Pueblo considered theirs. 
With the backing of his governor, Elias Suazo—Vigil’s father-in-law—Vigil told 
Newman, in Spanish, not to fence this place. Reiterating the Pueblo’s historic ownership 
of the area, Vigil exclaimed, “This land is ours.” Believing he had purchased the land 
only a few months previously, Newman considered his actions legitimate. “This is my 
 
33 Martin Vigil, interview by Dennis Stanford, 14 July 1970, p. 9 (side 1, tape 646), 
transcript, American Indian Oral History Collection, MSS 314 BC, Center for Southwest 
Research, University Libraries, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque [hereafter 
AIOHC, CSWR]. 
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land,” he rebutted. “I’m not going to move.”34 Vigil refused to argue: “I don’t want to 
talk, I’m just giving you orders by the governor, remove your fence and that’s the end of 
it, we will have no trouble.” Newman refused to take down his fence. Hence, a couple of 
weeks later and after much apprehensive discussion within the Tesuque community and 
tribal council, Vigil returned to remove the fencing with other men for support.35 By the 
day’s end, the Tesuque men had carried off three-and-a-half miles of fencing from two 
separate ranches.36
 The owner of the second ranch, Mr. Healy, whose fence the men also tore down, 
threatened the party from Tesuque with a shotgun. He promised that the first Indian who 
entered his property and refused to leave on demand was “going to stop a bullet.”37 Vigil 
was confident that the ranchers were in the wrong and apparently laughed this threat off: 
“He can’t kill us all, let him shoot if he wants to.” Police cars and Office of Indian Affairs 
(OIA) agents from nearby Santa Fe soon arrived, along with Pueblo lawyer Francis C. 
Wilson, who advised Vigil and his cohort to cease their actions. They eventually did so, 
but Vigil vowed to establish legally who owned this disputed land once and for all: He 
 
34 E.D. Newman to H. H. Johnson, 9 February 1922, folder: Indian Affairs, Controversy 
over Tesuque, box 2, Gov. Merritt C. Mechem Papers, Collection 1959-098, New Mexico 
State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe, New Mexico [hereafter Merrit Mechem 
Papers, NMSRCA]; and Vigil, interview, pp. 7, 8 (side 1, tape 646), transcript, AIOHC, 
CSWR. For E. D. Newman’s perspective on the Tesuque fence controversy, see the 
various Newman letters in folder 2, Merritt Mechem Papers, NMSRCA. 
35 Vigil, interview, pp. 7–8 (side 1, tape 646), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. 
36 “Indian Agent Has Refused Amends, Say Two Ranchers,” Santa Fe New Mexican, 10 
February 1922, 6. For the whole fence event see Vigil, interview, pp. 5–14 (side 1, tape 
646), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR; and Martin Vigil, interview by Dennis Stanford, 10 
December 1970, pp. 3–12 (side 1, tape 754), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. The Santa Fe 
New Mexican also covered elements of the event. See “Tesuque Braves Make Fence of 
Ranchman into Kindling,” Santa Fe New Mexican, 8 February 1922, 11; and “Indian 
Agent Has Refused Amends, Say Two Ranchers.” Pueblo historian Joe Sando (Jemez) 
also provides a brief description of this event in Sando, Pueblo Indians, 165. 
37 “Indian Agent Has Refused Amends, Say Two Ranchers.” 
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recalled, “For the sake of my land and the sake of my people . . . if we don’t do 
something right now, pretty soon we’ll be surround[ed by] the Spanish with non-Indians, 
Anglos, everybody come and help themself [sic].”38 The local newspaper, the Santa Fe 
New Mexican, portrayed the Indians as land grabbers and declared that Tesuque Pueblo 
was “on the Warpath—more or less.”39 Other ranchers in the area, “a representative 
bunch of red blooded true Americans,” armed themselves in response.40 Having heard the 
newspaper reports, San Juan Pueblo (now Ohkay Owingeh) governor José Ramos 
Archuleta led a group of men, ready to fight, to Tesuque a few days later. He told Vigil, 
“We are standing behind you . . . the Tewa people, we want to help you.”41 Vigil assured 
them that there was no war: “we’re fighting not with guns or arrow or anything [sic].” 
Instead, he told them, Tesuque was going to fight the incursions onto Tesuque land 
through official channels.42  
 This incident at Tesuque represented a much larger and long-running issue over 
Pueblo land rights across New Mexico. New Mexico’s nineteen Pueblos had lost 
thousands of acres of land to Anglo and Hispanic settlers since Europeans had first 
arrived in the valleys of New Mexico, beginning in the sixteenth century. In particular, 
since the U.S. annexation of the Southwest in 1848, settlers had erected fences adjacent 
to, and in many cases on, Pueblo lands. The rising tide of controversy over this issue, and 
the potential for violence, ultimately forced the federal government to act on the long-
standing issue of land rights across New Mexico. In 1922, Congress passed the Bursum 
 
38 Vigil, interview, pp. 9, 8 (side 1, tape 646), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. 
39 “Tesuque Braves Make Fence of Ranchman into Kindling.” 
40 E. D. Newman to [Com. of Ind. Af.] Charles Burke, 11 February 1922, folder: Indian 
Affairs, Controversy over Tesuque, box 2, Merritt Mechem Papers, NMSRCA. 
41 Vigil, interview, p. 12 (side 1, tape 754), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. 
42 Vigil, interview, p. 13 (side 1, tape 646), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. 
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bill, legislation that threatened to resolve most claims in favor of non-Indians. Stirred by 
the possibility of losing further lands, the APC began meeting regularly and formed a 
powerful coalition of Pueblo and non-Indian interests. With the help of community leader 
John Collier and clubwoman Stella Atwood—both Anglos—the APC coalition was able 
to defeat the Bursum bill and force the passing of the more favorable Pueblo Lands Board 
Act in 1924.  
 During the 1920s, the APC formalized itself as the official representative 
confederate council of all of the New Mexico Pueblos.43 Significantly, the Bursum bill 
fight and the wider issue of Pueblo land rights affected all nineteen Pueblos. The 
willingness of the Pueblos to unite with one another demonstrates that the Pueblos could 
achieve great success in protecting their homelands and their culture through political 
confederacy. (And further, the cooperation evident in the APC at this time, and 
throughout the twentieth century proves that the Pueblos have been keen to act in unison 
when their collective interest is threatened from outsiders.) Similarly, the APC’s 
willingness to co-opt a white coalition set a precedent that lasted throughout the twentieth 
century. The APC remained wary of individuals and organizations outside Pueblo 
society, but after working closely with Collier and Atwood during the Bursum bill 
struggle, the APC continued to cultivate meaningful political relationships with outsiders 
for the remainder of the century. These relationships ultimately proved invaluable in 
protecting Pueblo interests and preserving fundamental elements of Pueblo culture. This 
chapter in Pueblo history also acted as the springboard for the APC to become the most 
 
43 During the 1920s and into the 1930s, the APC often went by the name “Council of All 
of the New Mexico Pueblos.” For the sake of clarity I shall only refer to the organization 
by its more long-term name, the APC. 
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active and important element in collective Pueblo government during the twentieth 
century. 
 This is not to say that the APC stood unchallenged as a representative council of 
the Pueblos. The strength and success of the APC during and following on from the 
Bursum-bill fight brought the council into conflict with other groups with differing 
interests. First, during the Bursum-bill negotiations, the Pueblos’ coalition became 
wracked by in-fighting between various non-Indian organizations. Ultimately, one of the 
organizations, the New Mexico Association on Indian Affairs (NMAIA), who had 
previously backed the APC’s effort to defeat the Bursum bill, challenged the authority of 
the APC to speak for all Pueblos. While the APC had invited outside groups to represent 
the Pueblos' interests, these outsiders began to question the degree to which the APC 
represented Pueblo society and whether it operated independently. Second, individuals 
from various progressive factions within the Pueblo community formed the Council of 
Progressive Pueblo Indians. Backed by white reformers who wanted to see American 
Indians assimilate into the dominant culture, this council attempted to discredit the 
authority of the APC by denouncing its leaders to the Indian Office as backward 
traditionalists who governed the Pueblos with an iron fist. And last, in 1926, the Indian 
Office created the U.S. Pueblo Indian Council to rival the APC as an inter-Pueblo body. 
This new council was an attempt by the Indian Office to corral the members of the APC 
in a new forum controlled by the federal government. The Indian Office was perturbed at 
the actions of the APC because its members did not reflect the assimilationist line of 
national Indian policy.  
 19
 In many ways, the challenges to the authority of the APC during this time 
strengthened the significance of the council. The APC emerged in 1928 as an 
organization that could hold court with federal and state authorities and command respect 
from the Pueblo people of New Mexico. The struggles over land and the political 
conditions surrounding these events necessarily demanded a strong and unified response 
from the Pueblo community as a whole. Within this, the leaders of the APC utilized the 
position of the confederate council to transform the institution into a powerful regional 
organization. In so doing, the APC began to emerge as the most important element of the 
Pueblos’ political structure in dealing with outsiders. 
 The story of the APC during this period has important national consequences. The 
work of the APC in the 1920s can be considered a direct Native reaction against the 
general assimilation line of the Indian Office at the turn of the twentieth century. The 
APC was made up of more traditional but not completely conservative leaders who 
fought to maintain cultural continuity in Pueblo society. By expressing their right to 
represent the Pueblos independently from the federal government, they were also fighting 
assimilation. And further, their actions and successes in the 1920s and their relationship 
with Collier helped shepherd in a new day for Indians across America. The APC 
demonstrated that resistance to the dominant culture could be achieved by using political 
confederacy between Indians and with the help of sympathetic outsiders. 
 The action of Vigil and his Tesuque brothers in 1922 was only the latest incident 
in a centuries-long battle. By this time, the land situation in New Mexico had grown from 
a local issue to a state and federal embarrassment. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 
signed in 1848 after the U.S.-Mexico War and the U.S. annexation of northern Mexico, 
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guaranteed the Pueblos their land from the United States. The Pueblos resided on land 
that the Spanish empire had granted to its Native citizens.44 The Pueblos had lived 
alongside their Hispanic neighbors, predominantly on tightly packed fertile strips along 
the rivers of arid New Mexico. By the 1920s, the Pueblos still claimed historic ownership 
of their lands. Yet some Anglo and Hispanic settlers and squatters claimed they resided 
legally on Pueblo lands. Whether the Pueblos had legally relinquished the title to their 
lands, and thus whether the settlers were there legally, was a situation very much 
complicated by the changing citizenship status of the Pueblos under Spanish, Mexican, 
and then American rule.  
 The Pueblos were wards of the Spanish crown, but Mexico had granted the 
Pueblos citizenship in 1821. This status implied that the Pueblos could sell their land to 
non-Indians as well as purchase new lands. Complicating the legal position of the 
Pueblos under the United States, however, was their distinct position within the federal 
government’s categorization of Indians owing to their relationship to Spain and then 
Mexico. Similarly, because of their sedentary and agricultural lifestyle, the Pueblos 
defied the general assumption held by the federal government that all Indians were 
savages, and thus noncitizens.45
 In 1877, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on United States v. Joseph, which brought 
some legal definition to the Pueblos' position within America. The Joseph decision 
confirmed that the Pueblos were indeed able to hold title to their land, for they “hold their 
 
44 For a concise explanation of the land situation, see Dozier, Pueblo Indians, 107–8. For 
a more detailed discussion on these land issues, see G. Emlen Hall, Four Leagues of 
Pecos: A Legal History of the Pecos Grant, 1800–1933, New Mexico Land Grant Series 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984). 
45 See Hall, Four Leagues of Pecos, 128–138. 
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lands by a right superior to that of the United States”: the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 
Further, the court considered the Pueblos “too civilized to warrant federal protection.”46 
The decision left the Pueblos’ land susceptible to exploitation by non-Indians for the next 
twenty-five years.47  
 In 1913, the U.S. Supreme Court once more weighed in on the land situation in 
New Mexico when ruling on United States vs. Sandoval. The opinion of the court on this 
occasion concluded that despite the Pueblos’ sedentary and peaceful lifestyle, they were 
“nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and domestic government . . . adhering to 
primitive modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and fetichism . . . they are 
essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people.”48 While the language of this 
decision was derogatory toward the Pueblos, the Sandoval decision ruled that the Pueblos 
were indeed Indians, and thus could not alienate their lands. Sandoval eventually 
provided the Pueblos with a legal foundation to challenge the trespasses onto their land, 
for these violations contradicted the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Hispanic 
and Anglo settlers had undoubtedly bought and sold land on Pueblo property, in many 
ways because they assumed the Pueblos were citizens, as the Spanish affirmed. Santa 
Clara anthropologist Edward Dozier, however, doubted that “few, if any Pueblo Indians 
had ever sold land grants.”49 Regardless of what had previously passed, the Sandoval 
decision was a major contributing factor to the growing land tensions in the 1910s. 
 
46 United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 618 (1876); and Hall, Four Leagues of Pecos, 
135. 
47 Hall, Four Leagues of Pecos, 137. 
48 United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913). 
49 Dozier, Pueblo Indians, 108. 
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 The APC, too, was active during the Sandoval period, and fully aware of the 
growing issue of land rights affecting its constituents. On 18 May 1911, the APC met at 
Santa Clara Pueblo to request from the U.S. Indian Commissioner that the federal 
government commission a survey of all Pueblo lands. In its request to Commissioner 
Robert G. Valentine, the APC complained, “Every year somebody moves the boundaries 
in upon our lands, in some cases several miles.” The APC pointed out, “All of us have 
lost tracts of valuable land which were honestly ours under the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo.”50 The APC pointed out the power of its political confederation: “We have 
organized into a federation of tribes and have had there [sic] meetings which have 
resulted in a great good to us all. We study our condition from every point of view and 
we believe we have inaugurated a new upward movement which all New Mexico, white 
and Indian, will feel.”51 The APC closed its appeal by inviting the Indian Office to send a 
representative to its next meeting at Santo Domingo Pueblo. 
 In 1914, the federal government did indeed commission a survey of Pueblo lands 
in an attempt to establish how much Pueblo land non-Indians claimed. The Joy Survey 
may not have been a direct response to the APC appeal, but, more likely, a federal 
response to the Sandoval decision of the previous year. The Joy Survey aimed to provide 
the special attorney to the Pueblos, Francis Wilson, with “systematic, definite information 
about non-Indian claims to confirmed Pueblo land, so that he could begin the process of 
quieting title in the pueblos to their ancestral homes.”52 Martin Vigil, who later led 
 
50 U.S. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs, Survey of the 
Conditions of the Indians in the United States: Hearings on S. Res. 79, 308, and S. Res. 
263 and 416, 71st Cong., 2d sess., 1931, part 19, p. 9992. 
51 Ibid., p. 9997. 
52 Hall, Four Leagues of Pecos, 215. 
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Tesuque Pueblo members to tear down contested fences on adjoining land, remembered 
the arrival of the survey team. He stated that no Pueblos “knew anything about it, nobody 
consult with the people [sic].”53 The Pueblos and their supporters claimed that the 
surveyors “accepted any non-Indian claim, no matter how baseless or ludicrous.” The 
surveyors concluded that there were around three thousand non-Indian claims to 
“patented Pueblo land.” Perhaps equally significant, the survey indicated that non-Indian 
claims represented prime, irrigated land.54 And while the federal government maintained 
that the survey was not official and did not represent title to the lands, by recognizing the 
claims of non-Indians, the Joy Survey set a dangerous precedent.  
 Soon, non-Indian claimants began erecting fences on contested land using the 
boundaries recognized in the Joy Survey as a guideline. Some settlers began to apply to 
the Department of the Interior for patents to lands that the Joy Survey suggested were 
theirs.55 Vigil remembers that one particular fence erected at this time in Tesuque Pueblo 
represented fifty-five acres that the Pueblo considered theirs. In response, Tesuque elders 
began to question, “Why don’t we fight for our land or get some help?” Tesuque Pueblo 
leaders had little knowledge of what recourse they had legally, however, and had 
previously lived relatively peacefully with their non-Indian neighbors.56  
 Between the Joy Survey and the actions of Vigil in February 1922, the land 
situation became increasingly untenable for Pueblo communities. In May 1920, a U.S. 
House subcommittee on Indian Affairs visited Tesuque as part of a nationwide 
investigation into the operation of the Indian Office. Two Pueblo leaders used this 
 
53 Vigil, interview, p. 3 (side 1, tape 646), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. 
54 Hall, Four Leagues of Pecos, 215. 
55 Ibid., 219. 
56 Vigil, interview, p. 3 (side 1, tape 646), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. 
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hearing as an opportunity to highlight the growing land crises that had arisen, particularly 
since the Joy Survey. Representing seven of the Northern Pueblos, Ramos Archuleta of 
San Juan claimed, “to-day [sic] we have less than half of the lands contained in that 
survey of the patent.”57 And further, non-Indians “live inside some of our land, and, of 
course, we want the Government to help us out in that question.” Porfirio Montoya of 
Taos Pueblo echoed Archuleta’s sentiments, claiming that his people, too, had lost 
significant land since the Joy Survey.58 Importantly, both men became vocal leaders for 
the APC in the imminent Bursum-bill struggle, demonstrating that the Pueblos were both 
conscious and active on the issue of land well before John Collier and other white 
outsiders entered the fray surrounding Pueblo land. About eighteen months later, Vigil 
and other Tesuque men took the growing Pueblo frustrations out on fences that were 
erected in response to the Joy Survey. The message was clear: the Pueblos would no 
longer accept encroachment onto land that was legally theirs. Vigil vowed to establish 
legally who owned the disputed land, once and for all. 
After bloodshed was only “narrowly averted” at Tesuque, the local impetus to 
resolve this particular incident, and the wider problem, ballooned. Consequently, there 
was a four-day court hearing in Santa Fe to hear the opinions of all parties. 59 By this 
point, however, it was unlikely that any number of court hearings would resolve the 
Pueblos' land nightmare. In July 1922, Congress attempted to quiet the growing 
frustration when Sen. Holm O. Bursum of New Mexico drafted the Bursum bill. The bill 
 
57 U.S. House Subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs, Investigation of the 
Field Service: Hearings on Indians of the United States, 66th Cong., 2d sess., 1920, vol. 
3, pp. 595, 596. 
58 Ibid., pp. 600–5. 
59 Philp, John Collier’s Crusade, 28; and Sando, Pueblo Indians, 165. 
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contained many dangerous provisions for the Pueblos. Significantly, those non-Indian 
claimants who could provide “secondary evidence” of possession of their lands before 10 
June 1900 would have been entitled to a decree from a local court that gave them title to 
the land. Similarly, the Bursum draft gave the Pueblos very limited water rights, and 
dictated that they correspond with the courts before irrigating any new acres. Perhaps 
most disturbingly for the Pueblos, the bill also directed the New Mexico District Court to 
accept all Joy Survey boundaries as final. Most importantly, the legislation placed on the 
Pueblos the onus to provide evidence of continuous ownership of their lands. Congress 
quickly pushed the legislation through before the summer recess.60 The Bursum bill 
would have officially handed virtually all contested lands to non-Indian claimants. 
Non-Indian organizations and individuals began rallying to the Pueblos’ cause. 
The General Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC), a rather conservative community-
based women’s philanthropic organization with substantial lobbying power, formed a 
standing committee on Indian welfare in 1921. The committee was designed to improve 
the economic conditions of Indians nationwide and, with federal cooperation, aid them in 
regaining land rights. The GFWC appointed Atwood, who had a close relationship with 
Hopi Pueblo, chair of the newly established committee. Quite separately, in the winter of 
1920–21, community organizer John Collier made a visit to Taos Pueblo and fell in love 
with what he considered the communal and mystic way of life the Tiwa Pueblo practiced. 
In July 1921, Atwood and Collier met in Salt Lake City at a GFWC meeting, where the 
pair realized their mutual concern for Native American tribes and the Pueblos in 
 
60 For a concise legislative narrative of the Bursum bill, see Philp, “Albert B. Fall and the 
Protest from the Pueblos,” 240–243. Lawrence Kelly’s analysis of the legislative process 
is also valuable. See Kelly, The Assault on Assimilation, chap. 6. 
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particular. The following summer, Atwood appointed Collier the Indian field agent of the 
GFWC. According to historian Karin L. Huebner, in fall 1922 Atwood became aware of 
the Bursum bill and informed Collier of the pending legislation, and “together they 
launched a publicity campaign to defeat it.” 61  
Back in New Mexico, the Pueblos also began organizing politically. Pablo Abeita, 
a prominent member of Isleta Pueblo, an Indian Office judge, and long-time APC 
delegate, began rousing opposition to the Bursum bill and was soon joined by Collier.62 
In September and October 1922, Collier and Abeita traveled to many of New Mexico’s 
Pueblos in an attempt to bring the bill to each Pueblo’s attention.63 When passing through 
Tesuque, Collier stopped by Governor Suazo’s house, where Vigil later remembered 
meeting Collier for the first time. Vigil felt that their conversation was unremarkable and 
was wary of informing this strange-looking white man about the problems Tesuque and 
other Pueblos had encountered. According to Vigil, Collier looked “like a tramp” and 
struck him as the “nervous type.”64 Nonetheless, this was one of the first moments in a 
relationship between Collier and the Pueblos that would span over many decades and 
help protect the most important elements of Pueblo life and culture from Anglo 
encroachment.  
 
61 Huebner, “An Unexpected Alliance,” 349–350, 350–51, 354. 
62 Wenger, We Have a Religion, 105. 
63 The historical record is unclear as to whether John Collier was the first to bring this bill 
to the Pueblos’ attention. Certainly, he spent the month of September traveling to many 
Pueblos. Historian Tisa Wenger suggests Abeita took similar actions in October. See 
Wenger, We Have a Religion, 105. Either way, both Abeita and Collier were central to 
publicizing the bill to Pueblo communities. For more on Abeita, see Patricia Burke 
Guggino, “Pablo Abeita: (1871–1940) Cultural Broker between Isleta Pueblo in New 
Mexico and the United States Government” (M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 
1995). 
64 Vigil, interview, pp. 12–13 (side 1, tape 754), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. 
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After Collier had journeyed farther south, Cochiti, Santo Domingo, and Isleta 
Pueblos organized an APC meeting at Santo Domingo Pueblo on 5 November 1922 to 
thrash out the Pueblo response to the Bursum bill.65 At this historic meeting chaired by 
Charlie Kie of Laguna Pueblo, 121 delegates from twenty Pueblos, including the 
abandoned Pecos, attended, along with a number of key members of the Indian Office, 
Pueblo lawyer Francis C. Wilson, and other white friends of the Pueblos such as Collier. 
After a lengthy general discussion and a smaller, private, Pueblo-only deliberation lasting 
two or three hours, the APC drafted “An Appeal by the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico to 
the People of the United States,” which was then read to the wider group in English, 
Spanish, Keresan, Tewan, and Zunian. The appeal noted the urgency of the threat facing 
the Pueblos: “We have reached a point where we must either live or die.” 66 The 
document was unanimously adopted and signed by all Pueblo delegates present. At 
Collier’s recommendation, the council also agreed to send a number of delegates on a 
high-profile trip to the Northeast. The meeting represented a powerful declaration of 
cooperation between the Pueblos. Even though this was not the APC’s first meeting—by 
any means—Collier concluded, “Henceforth they intend to stand together for mutual 
 
65 For a more full description of the series of events that led to this meeting and some 
limited description of the meeting itself, see Collier’s testimony in U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, Pueblo Indian Lands: 
Hearings on S.3865 and S.4223, 67th Cong., 4th sess., 1923, pp. 120–21. 
66 The full version of this appeal exists on record in U.S. Senate, Pueblo Indian Lands: 
Hearings, 1923, pp. 77–78. A limited version of the text also appeared on the front page 
of the Santa Fe New Mexican the day after the meeting. “Indian Bill Will Destroy Pueblo 
Life, Say Indians in Memorial to Country,” Santa Fe New Mexican, 6 November 1922, 1. 
The New York Times also covered the event in an overly romanticized article by 
Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, “Big Powwow of Pueblos,” New York Times, 26 November 
1922, 69. 
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aid.”67 Indeed the Pueblos’ willingness to accept the help of Collier, Atwood, and their 
respective organizations was a significant step towards larger cooperation among Pueblos 
and Anglos. 
 In late 1922 and into early 1923, Collier and Atwood began publicizing the 
Pueblos’ cause. Collier used Survey magazine and Sunset Magazine to highlight the 
deficiencies of the Bursum bill, which resulted in the close involvement of the NMAIA 
and Eastern Association on Indian Affairs in the land fight. Using the various voluntary 
organizations that came to the Pueblos’ aide, interested individuals penned a number of 
articles that published in prominent national newspapers and magazines. These articles 
appeared in Outlook, New Republic, Nation, New York World, Christian Science Monitor, 
New York Times, and the Santa Fe New Mexican, among others.68 The Pueblo coalition 
collected money for its campaign from the constituents of these organizations. 
 The Pueblo response to the Bursum bill and the help they received from outsiders 
made the legislation a toxic issue in Congress, which recalled the bill on 21 November 
1922. And while the repeal of the Bursum bill was a success for the APC, its leaders 
needed to include their voice in any new measures Congress took next. At the behest of 
Collier, the Pueblos began planning a delegation for a visit to Washington, D.C., via 
Chicago, and New York City. The APC hoped that the delegation could publicize the 
Pueblos’ land struggle to the wider public, and drum up lobbying and financial support 
enroute. In mid-January 1923, Sotero Ortiz, who was elected APC chairman at the 
meeting in Santo Domingo, came to Tesuque in his Cadillac to pick up traditional Pueblo 
regalia to take on the tour. While he was there, Ortiz elected Vigil to travel with the 
 
67 U.S. Senate, Pueblo Indian Lands: Hearings, 1923, p. 121. 
68 Philp, John Collier’s Crusade, 34. 
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delegation, pointing to Vigil’s long-term attendance at APC meetings as proof of his 
suitability. Vigil put on his traditional Tesuque clothing, had a farewell dinner, and 
departed with fourteen Pueblo “costumes”—the Tesuque Lincoln cane in hand—as the 
youngest member of the Pueblo delegation.69 The delegation met at Lamy, New Mexico, 
and boarded a Pullman car for Chicago.70  
After a bumpy ride on the train, Abeita, Ortiz, Antonio Romero (Taos), and others 
spoke in front of various organizations in Chicago, including the Chicago Indian Rights 
Association, to encourage members to lobby Congress on the Pueblos’ behalf. They also 
appealed for financial assistance to fund their trip and other general efforts. Next, part of 
the delegation stopped in New York City, and on 15 January the New York Times 
reported Romero’s feelings on the land situation: “We want the white squatters put off 
our lands, and we ask that we have a voice in governing ourselves.”71 A number of the 
Pueblo delegation also danced outside the New York stock exchange. Collier remembers 
that their performance sent two thousand bankers “wild.” He deemed the dances a grand 
success because many of these bankers subsequently lobbied Congress in opposition to 
the Bursum bill.72  
Vigil and the Pueblos used their dances to achieve political success. Collier 
consciously aimed to use Pueblo performances to arouse “the feeling of the American 
 
69 Martin Vigil, interview by Dennis Stanford, 26 January 1971, pp. 19–20 (side 2, tape 
764), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. The Lincoln canes represent the authority of an 
individual to represent his respective Pueblo. For more on the Lincoln canes, see Sando, 
Pueblo Nations, 244. 
70 Vigil, interview, p. 21 (side 2, tape 764), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. 
71 “City Too Cramped for Pueblo Indians,” New York Times, 15 January 1923, 28. For 
more on the trip to Chicago, New York, and Washington, D.C., from John Collier’s 
perspective, see Philp, John Collier’s Crusade, 38–41. 
72 All Pueblo Council meeting minutes, 17 January 1924, n.p., reel 8, microfilm, Collier 
Papers. 
 30
                                                
people.”73 Historian Philip Deloria has pointed out that the identities of “Indianness” and 
“Americanness” are laden with connections. Both Anglo Americans and Native 
Americans have co-opted Indian identities for political purposes since the birth of the 
American republic. As the idea of “Indianness” was under threat during this period, many 
Native American leaders “played Indian,” employing “antimodern primitivism to defend 
native cultures against the negative stereotypes left over from colonial conquest.”74 As an 
expert eagle dancer, Vigil saw no harm in performing Pueblo dances, saying “our dances 
are not wicked like you people.”75
The delegation spent a further week in New York City after returning from 
Washington and spoke at a town-hall meeting attended by “many thousand people,” 
according to Vigil. The audience was so numerous, they seemed “just like ants.” At this 
meeting, Vigil finally worked up the courage to speak after a series of other men had 
done so. He spent a few moments addressing the audience in his native Tewa language 
before making a heartfelt plea in English concerning the conditions of Tesuque and 
Pueblo life. During his twenty-minute speech, Vigil defended Pueblo land, religion, and 
life. “I kind of light up,” Vigil remembered, and along with the other Pueblo speakers, he 
made quite an impression on the audience. 76 After they had spoken, many people came 
to shake hands with the delegation, Vigil was embraced by a Catholic archbishop, and 
individuals from the audience contributed fourteen hundred dollars to the Pueblos’ 
cause.77 After this experience, Vigil thought he “was big then, boy!” and went on to 
 
73 Ibid. 
74 Philip J. Deloria, Playing Indian (New York: Yale University Press, 1998), 122. 
75 Vigil, interview, p. 25 (side 2, tape 764), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. 
76 Vigil, interview, pp. 32, 33 (side 1, tape 646), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. 
77 Vigil, interview, p. 27 (side 2, tape 764), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. According to 
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speak at every subsequent engagement with the APC delegation. Equally important was 
that, despite his youth, his Pueblo peers encouraged Vigil to speak up at future APC 
meetings.78 Indeed public engagements such as this became increasingly common for 
many of the Pueblo leaders, who used this experience as a blueprint for the future. 
Speaking at events hosted by interested parties and dancing in front of crowds 
ensured that the news media covered the Pueblos’ campaign, as historian Herman Viola 
states.79 It was in Congressional hearings in Washington, D.C., however, that the APC’s 
success was realized. Between 15–25 January 1923, the Senate Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Public Lands and Surveys listened to testimony from Abeita, Collier, and 
Wilson. Together, they pointed out the inherent wrongs in the Bursum bill. Indeed Abeita 
appealed to the committee by pointing out the Pueblos’ long history of facing outsiders: 
“We were civilized and lived as such until you came in to disrupt and corrupt our method 
of civilization.”80 Having convinced the subcommittee that the Bursum bill was grossly 
unfair, the delegation departed Washington. Its lawyer, Wilson, remained to negotiate a 
substitute proposal. The eventual bill he agreed to—the Lenroot bill—was not authorized 
by the APC, was sympathetic to the settlers’ interests, and contained no provision for 
 
Vigil, this particular event netted the Pueblos sixteen hundred dollars. The New York 
Times, however, quoted this figure at fourteen hundred dollars. “Plea For Pueblo 
Indians,” New York Times, 25 January 1923, 9. 
78 Vigil, interview, p. 26 (side 2, tape 764), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. 
79 Herman J. Viola, Diplomats in Buckskins: A History of Indian Delegations in 
Washington City (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1981), 193. This 
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80 Pablo Abeita, in U.S. Senate, Pueblo Indian Lands: Hearings, 1923, p. 190. Abeita’s 
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compensation to the Pueblos for any lost lands. As the APC delegation returned to New 
Mexico, Collier made his way back to Washington to fire Wilson as the Pueblos’ 
lawyer.81
Defeating the Bursum bill and then the Lenroot bill was equally divisive for the 
APC as it was transformative. Soon, “the whole matter of the lands and the rights of the 
Pueblo Indians” became “sorely entangled in the cobweb of politics.”82 When Wilson, 
backed by the NMAIA, agreed to the Lenroot bill and was subsequently sacked, the 
Pueblos non-Indian coalition fell apart.  Collier and the APC felt betrayed by Wilson’s 
actions in agreeing to a substitute proposal that could potentially ruin the Pueblos land 
situation. Having worked on Pueblo land for a long period, Wilson had some sympathy 
for the interests of the Hispanic settlers who, he believed, had purchased land from the 
Pueblos in good faith before the Sandoval decision in 1913.83 Thus, representing the 
NMAIA and other interests including the Eastern Association, Wilson claimed the middle 
ground, a position that was more favorable to the political community in Santa Fe than 
Collier’s and the APC’s position.  
Collier, on the other hand, told Wilson, “You, Mr. Wilson, were given complete 
trust by the Indians and their friends who believed you would stand immutably for certain 
gains and against certain surrenders.”84 Wilson claimed that Collier’s position was 
 
81 Vigil, interview, p. 2 (side 2, tape 646), transcript, AIOHC, CSWR. 
82 Elwood Hendrick to Dr. Burton E. Livingston [Am Assoc. for the Advancement of 
Science], 29 January 1923, folder: 89ELH .046, box 4, Edgar Hewett Collection, 
Archives of the Laboratory of Anthropology, Santa Fe, New Mexico [hereafter Hewett 
Papers, LA]. 
83 Wenger, We Have a Religion, 129. Wenger’s text contains a more complete version of 
these complicated events. Further, Wenger's work is more up to date than Philp and 
Kelly’s assessment and focuses more on a Pueblo perspective. 
84 John Collier to Francis C. Wilson, 13 April 1923, p. 3., folder 34, box 41, Francis C. 
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“vicious and destructive” due to his “opposition to law and forms of law.”85  Having 
sacked Wilson, Collier wrote to him, “I hope there will be no controversy. . . . But 
controversy is better than surrender.”86
Partly in order to help defeat the Lenroot Bill, in the spring of 1923 Collier 
formed a new New York-based organization, the American Indian Defense Association 
(AIDA). Collier was installed as executive secretary of the new body, which aimed to 
fundamentally reform federal Indian policy.87 In her analysis of Pueblo religious 
struggles in the 1920s, Tisa Wenger points out that the white coalition in many ways split 
along lines that represented their views on Pueblo culture. While Collier and the GFWC 
respected Pueblo culture and wanted to protect it as it was, the NMAIA and Eastern 
Association ultimately believed that the Pueblos should assimilate into mainstream 
America.88 These assimilationist organizations certainly believed they represented the 
interest of the Pueblos, but, as was the case in many aspects of his life, Collier had a 
powerful need to control proceedings from the center. And only by running his own 
organization could he achieve this.  
Significantly, Collier’s policy of defending Pueblo land with little compromise 
secured the official backing of the Pueblos when, on 25 August 1923, the APC held 
another meeting at Santo Domingo. Despite protest from Wilson to support the Lenroot 
substitute, the APC produced a statement articulating its express support of Collier, the 
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Assault on Assimilation, 255–94. 
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AIDA, the GFWC, and any work these organizations may do on the Pueblos’ behalf in 
defeating the Lenroot bill.89 The APC also demanded that the federal government provide 
compensation for lost lands—a provision absent from the Lenroot substitute.90 
Significantly, the APC gave no mention of other organizations, including the NMAIA 
and Eastern Association on Indian Affairs, that had previously helped defeat the Bursum 
bill. 
Five days after this APC meeting, the NMAIA hosted a meeting of its own in 
Santa Fe to discuss the emergence of the AIDA, and the APC’s apparent shunning of 
their support. Roberts Walker attended, representing the Eastern Association and 
members of other smaller regional organizations were also present. Obviously unaware of 
how the APC functioned, Walker protested against the APC meeting of the previous 
week, suggesting that since there was no legislation to discuss, a meeting was 
unnecessary. Walker also accused the APC of being unrepresentative of the inter-Pueblo 
community. He did not understand  “by what method” individual Pueblos sent delegates 
to the meeting, and accused the APC’s vote of being “no more pueblo action, or Indian 
action, than action by this informal meeting here would be action of the city of Santa 
Fe.”91  
 
89 Council of All the New Mexico Pueblos meeting statement, 25 August 1923, folder 
891SC.006, Ina Sizer Cassidy Papers, Archives of the Laboratory of Anthropology, Santa 
Fe, New Mexico [hereafter Cassidy Papers, LA]. 
90 The statement also exists in “Pueblos Take Strong Stand to Get Lands,” Santa Fe New 
Mexican, 27 August 1923, 2. 
91 New Mexico Association on Indian Affairs meeting minutes, 30 August 1923, p. 2, 
folder: correspondence 1922–23, box 9689, Southwestern Association on Indian Affairs 
records, collection 1976-037, New Mexico State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe, 
New Mexico [hereafter SWAIA Papers, NMSRCA]. 
 35
                                                
 The NMAIA’s opinion on the APC was further complicated by the position taken 
by Laguna Pueblo at this time. Laguna was a more progressive Pueblo and its leadership 
was very much influenced by Father Fridolin Schuster, a man who ultimately hoped to 
assimilate his Native flock fully into American society. Thus, Laguna sent delegates to 
APC meetings, but they did not have the authority to vote in an official capacity. When, 
on 29 August, the Santa Fe New Mexico incorrectly reported that Laguna, Santo 
Domingo, San Felipe, Cochiti, Santa Ana, and Sandia were not present at the APC 
meeting on 25 August, the NMAIA saw this as further evidence of the APC’s 
unrepresentative nature.92 Ina Sizer Cassidy, a close friend of Collier and the Pueblos, 
pointed out to the NMAIA, however, that this report was “absolutely wrong.” Cassidy 
was present at the APC meeting and remembered that “a general vote was taken and 
every pueblo were in favor [of being represented by the AIDA and GFWC] and voted on 
it except Laguna, who was given instructions not to vote on anything.”93 While this was 
discussed at the NMAIA meeting, the only Indian present, Martin Herrera of Santo 
Domingo, attempted to quell the suspicion surrounding the APC and Collier: “John 
Collier is doing what the Indians want, and he is going to do it.”94  
 Wilson eventually backed down from attacking the APC, conceding that “it isn’t 
really a question of whether the Indians are for Mr. Collier’s proposition, but with us it is 
the question of whether Mr. Collier’s proposition is actually one that can be actually 
 
92 “Pueblos Take Strong Stand to Get Lands,” Santa Fe New Mexican, 27 August 1923, 
2; and “New Mexico Association On Indian Affairs Takes Issue with Action at Domingo; 
Statement of its Position,” Santa Fe New Mexican, 29 August 1923, 2. 
93 New Mexico Association on Indian Affairs meeting minutes, 30 August 1923, p. 20, 
SWAIA Papers, NMSRCA 
94 Ibid., p. 14. 
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accomplished.”95 Perhaps the main motivation for the objections of Wilson was that he 
and the NMAIA wanted to work alongside the Indian Office and local Hispanics. The 
APC, on the other hand, was explicitly turning to a more extreme position at this time, 
and threatened to disrupt the local political conditions in New Mexico. Wilson was 
worried that Collier and the APC were determined not to compromise. He noted, “the 
Indian Office is very much aroused and feels highly injured.”96
Despite the protests of the NMAIA, the APC and AIDA formed a strong coalition 
that, by not backing down and asserting Pueblo sovereignty, was able to negotiate a more 
favorable outcome for the Pueblos. After a meeting on 17 January 1924, the APC chose 
thirteen delegates to visit Washington once again, this time in conjunction with the 
AIDA. According to Vigil, this time around “it didn’t take long” to settle the issue and 
after two or three days in the capital, “everything was alright.”97 In fact, this APC 
delegation helped convince Congress to pass the Pueblo Lands Board Act, which 
sanctioned the formation of a three-person body in Santa Fe to hear land claims and 
establish Pueblo boundaries. Significantly, the legislation put the onus on Hispanic and 
Anglo claimants to prove continuous possession of contested land, and also included the 
“principle of compensation” for the Pueblos.98 All non-Indian settlers found to be on 
Pueblo lands unlawfully were to be evicted by the Indian Office. The Pueblos Lands 
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Board Act was landmark legislation for the Pueblos and the APC. The Pueblos had 
suffered from unofficial encroachment on their lands for many decades and had also 
faced down Supreme Court decisions and Congressional legislation that would have 
formally displaced the Pueblos from their homelands. And while the Pueblos would 
never reclaim all lost lands, the PLB had the potential to draw a line under the 
encroachment on their land and provide monetary support for lands lost. 
According to Vigil, the APC “learned so many things” because of Collier’s input 
in the land struggle, and “the All Pueblo Council start[ed] improving.” Non-Indian 
encouragement to go to Washington, D. C., in a united front was a significant step in the 
council’s evolution.99 Indeed this moment was equally important for the delegation 
members. These experiences laid the foundation for the governing of the APC and the 
pursuit of pragmatic Pueblo governance in the twentieth century. A string of Pueblo 
leaders gained formative experience defending Pueblo sovereignty and the APC made 
only limited concessions regarding Pueblo land as its negotiations with the federal 
government evolved. By standing united and with the help of outsiders who understood 
Pueblo culture and the significance of land to the Pueblos, the APC negotiated the 
Pueblos a favorable position for the twentieth century. The dynamics of the Pueblo 
coalition also demonstrated that by choosing their friends carefully, employing outside 
help could help protect tradition and sustain Pueblo sovereignty. 
Negotiating the passage of the Pueblo Lands Board Act was not the only 
significant challenge to the Pueblos or the APC during the early 1920s. In the midst of 
the Lenroot substitute fiasco in February 1923, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles 
 
99 Martin Vigil, interview by Dennis Stanford, 16 February 1971 (tape 775), transcript, 
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Burke—a hard-line assimilationist—denounced traditional Pueblo dances as “evil . . . 
foolish . . . useless and harmful.”100 Burke eventually attempted to ban the dances, as 
“missionaries and government officials” expressed “renewed concerns about the moral 
influence of Indian dances.”101 The Indian Office thought the dances were inappropriate 
and sexually oriented. In response, the APC accused the Indian Office of “religious 
persecution.” “Our religion is more precious than even our lives.”102 Importantly, 
however, the attacks on Indian dances came from many corners. While the Indian Office 
led the charge from non-Indians, backed by missionaries and Christian-based 
organizations such as the Indian Rights Association of Philadelphia, so-called progressive 
Pueblo Indians also began a series of attacks on Pueblo culture and political organization. 
As the voice of more traditional authority, the APC became the focus of many internal 
and external attacks on legitimate Pueblo governance. Thus, as well as becoming a debate 
between competing and interested non-Indians on the relative need for assimilation of the 
nation’s Indians, the Pueblo dance debate also became a dialogue that challenged the 
APC’s very legitimacy as a representative body from inside and outside the Pueblo 
community.  
Factionalism within individual Pueblos was a fairly common and organic 
phenomenon well before the twentieth century, as different clans and moieties clashed 
 
100 Charles H. Burke to All Indians, 24 February 1923, folder: 891SC. 012, Cassidy 
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over the legitimate governance of internal affairs. This situation was exacerbated at the 
end of the nineteenth century when the federal government sent Native Americans from 
across the United States to federally administered, off-reservation, Indian boarding 
schools. Some students returning to their homelands brought back different conceptions 
of modernity and frequently favored a more progressive approach going forward. As 
outside interests began questioning the morality of what they labeled pagan Pueblo 
dances, progressive Pueblo Indians from many tribes voiced their concerns over more 
traditional or conservative leaders and the power of caciques within Pueblo society. And 
while progressive Indians were able to gain publicity by piggybacking on external 
criticisms of Pueblo culture, the genuine intentions and sentiment of the progressives was 
complicated by controversies caused by non-Indians.  
In an attempt to reform many aspects of Pueblo life, progressive Indians 
themselves took center stage during the dance controversy. John Dixon, from Cochiti 
Pueblo, who was educated at Carlisle Indian School, in Pennsylvania, and worked as an 
Indian Office–appointed judge, eventually became the chairman of a progressive Pueblo 
Council. Holding a rather extreme position even within the progressives, Dixon believed: 
“The old parties are still savages, barbarians, idolaters. There are only two ways to settle 
our disputes, either we of the new parties become savages again, or . . . they [more 
traditional Pueblo society] become at least a little civilized, as we of the new are trying to 
be.”103 Men such as Dixon were unhappy with multiple facets of Pueblo society, and due 
to the scrutiny the Indian Office gave the Pueblos’ religious and political institutions at 
this time, they were able to gain a strong foothold in inter-Pueblo politics.  
 
103 John Dixon to John Collier, 14 November 1922, Peña Blanca, New Mexico, reel 4, 
microfilm, Collier Papers. 
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Despite the legitimate complaints of progressive Indians, the majority of whom 
were not looking to destroy their culture, only adjust it, their cause was often complicated 
by the interference of outsiders connected to the Indian Office or other assimilationist and 
Christian organizations. The more traditional Pueblo leaders, including the majority of 
Pueblo governors and caciques, and thus APC members, at this time also had to defend 
their culture against outsiders. “The so-called progressive element in our pueblos,” stated 
Jose Aguilar of San Ildefonso, “provides a wedge by which outsiders manage to become 
parties in our internal disputes.”104  
On 12 April 1923, Antonio Abetia (Isleta), Sotero Ortiz, and José Alcario 
Montoya (Cochiti) were among a few men hosting an APC meeting at Santiago Pena’s 
house at Santo Domingo Pueblo. And in an incident that exemplifies the impact of non-
Indians on the progressive cause, while the men attempted to draw up the APC response 
to Burke’s dancing circular, Nina Otero-Warren rushed through the back door of the 
house and burst into the meeting. In an attempt to discredit the APC’s remaining 
coalition, Otero-Warren, a close associate of the Indian Rights Association and an Indian 
Office inspector of Indian schools in New Mexico, accused the APC’s friends of being 
propagandists.105 While Collier and white friends to the APC were frequently present at 
APC meetings, this was one of many meetings held during this time where the Pueblos 
wanted to speak to one another without the interference of outsiders—especially as the 
subject matter in this case was culturally specific. Montoya, who was instrumental to the 
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APC during these early years, remembered that no non-Indian was invited to this meeting 
and, further, when they asked Warren to leave, she refused.106 Otero-Warren also visited 
other Pueblos across New Mexico in an attempt to discredit Collier, the AIDA, and the 
APC. 
At this time, the Indian Office as well as Christian organizations presented the 
APC and Collier as opponents to progress and as supporting outdated and irrelevant 
cultural and religious practices, which were supported by the Pueblos’ traditional political 
structures. One organization in particular, the eastern-based Indian Rights Association, 
became closely involved with denouncing Pueblo dances, the peyote practice at some 
Pueblos, and other cultural practices. According to Wenger, the Indian Rights 
Association encouraged and publicized the progressives’ complaints.107 IRA president 
Herbert Welsh articulated his goal as simply “Indian progress towards a better day.”108 
Yet other associates of the organization, such as Clara True, were accused of deliberately 
agitating the religious and political conditions on the ground in New Mexico. Even 
Schuster, who supported much of the progressives’ cause, accused True and Warren of 
“sniffing around” Acoma and Laguna. He was suspicious of their intentions.109 Aguilar 
thought that True reveled in creating trouble within Pueblos and, in an appeal to Collier, 
labeled her a “meddlesome busybody.” Expressing his support for Pueblo autonomy, 
while simultaneously requesting Collier’s help (he and the APC did not consider the two 
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mutually exclusive), Aguilar asked for “the chance to run our own affairs in our own 
way.”110
In May 1924, True and Warren helped progressive Pueblo parties form the 
Council of Progressive Pueblo Indians, composed of twenty-five men from the 
progressive factions of Santa Clara, Cochiti, San Juan, and Santa Ana Pueblos. The 
Progressive Council hoped to assert itself as an inter-Pueblo body recognizable to the 
Indian Office, and aligned itself in direct opposition to the more traditionally composed 
APC. The newly formed Progressive Council penned a statement highlighting their 
grievances, which included being chastised for refusing to partake in community ditch 
work and being held under the power of the conservative factions of their pueblos, and 
caciques in particular. They articulated many of their arguments around the notion of 
American religious freedom, and claimed that they should be free to practice Pueblo 
religion to any extent they wished without the fear of punishment from Pueblo leaders.111
In June 1924, the GFWC hosted a convention in California, which Wenger labels 
“a showdown event between competing reformers in the dance controversy.”112 True and 
Warren organized the progressives, inviting seven members of the council to speak in 
front of the clubwomen in an attempt to shift the sympathies of the women away from the 
APC. Simultaneously, Atwood and Collier circulated APC resolutions and gained the 
support of the Los Angeles Times to portray favorably their version of Pueblo life. 
Members of the APC also appeared at the convention to defend their traditional lifeways. 
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Employing the terminology of religious freedom, True and Warren essentialized the 
debate, claiming that the progressives were fighting a Christian battle to defeat 
paganism.113 Ultimately, the event did not noticeably impact the result of this debate. The 
convention does show, however, how outside interests and the influence of outsiders 
were important elements in the Pueblos’ battles. 
 Responding to the multiple accusations of the progressive council back in New 
Mexico, the APC quickly defended the traditional elements of Pueblo society and 
governance. The APC released a statement to the Santa Fe New Mexican, primarily 
defending the position of cacique within Pueblo government. They stated that while 
caciques have the right to nominate Pueblo officials, such as the governor and thus APC 
members, they do not do so to harm any person or faction. The APC then attacked the 
progressive council, labeling the members a “few persons, a bunch of gruntled [sic] 
fellows who refuse to do your share of the work in your own Pueblo.” Finally, the APC 
accused the progressive council of attempting to split the unity of the Pueblos and the 
strength of the APC during the crucial period of the PLB.114  
At a packed APC meeting in July 1924, multiple progressive Pueblos, including 
Dixon, as well as Warren and True, were present and spoke at length about the recently 
enacted PLB. The APC feared that dissension between and within the Pueblos would 
weaken their ability to reclaim lost lands. Since progressive Pueblos tended to have a 
more formally recognizable education, they could appeal to the PLB more effectively 
than APC leaders. Thus while the conflict between progressive and traditional leadership 
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arose over cultural and religious matters, the question of land still loomed large over 
Pueblo communities. Undoubtedly, the APC was composed primarily of more traditional 
leaders from within Pueblo society. Yet, the APC did include progressive voices. Pablo 
Abieta, for example, considered himself a progressive member of Isleta and served for a 
long period as an Indian Office–appointed judge there. Yet he remained a key leader of 
the APC for many years and was consistently nominated by his peers into high-profile 
positions of leadership. 
At the meeting, APC chairman Ortiz called for calm and unity: “The only way we 
can defend our rights is that we shall be united as brethren.”115 And while Dixon 
expressed his willingness to work with the APC on the question of Pueblo lands, True 
and Warren spent much of the meeting questioning whether the assembly was even 
representative of the Pueblos across New Mexico.116 They pointed to the presence of 
delegates from Zuni and accused them of not representing that Pueblo’s community due 
to a conflict in governance there. True and Warren also considered it inappropriate that a 
Pueblo barely affected by the land situation would have delegates present at the 
meeting.117  
As evidenced here, the APC was far from immune to external and internal 
questions over how representative it was of all Pueblos, despite its success in protecting 
Pueblo homelands. In disagreements over the role of religion in Pueblo culture, the APC 
did not ignore the progressives. The meeting from July 1924 shows the APC considered 
the concept of Pueblo unity as the number-one priority, and this included the progressive 
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microfilm, Collier Papers. 
116 Ibid., 38. 
117 Ibid., 30–33. 
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factions of Pueblo society. And while the APC surely did not respect some progressive 
individuals as much as traditional ones, its leaders recognized the importance of 
presenting a united front to the outside world on the question of land.  
Equally important, the Indian Office began to stand with the progressives and in 
opposition to the APC. While factionalism within Pueblos continued to be a legitimate 
issue within many Pueblo communities, the significance of the progressive council soon 
declined. The question of assimilation, however, led the Indian Office to challenge the 
authority of the APC. In 1926, the Indian Office created another body to rival the All 
Pueblo Council: the United States Pueblo Indian Council. Earlier in that same year the 
former chairman of the NMAIA, Margaret McKittrick, proposed to Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs Charles Burke that a new body might help open a dialogue between the 
Indian Office and Pueblo governors and officials. McKittrick still held grievances over 
the split of the coalition and felt that such a council would help dissolve Collier’s 
influence in Pueblo politics.118 She suggested that the Indian Office mould the new 
council in the same form as the recently established Navajo Tribal Council, which former 
New Mexico territorial governor Herbert J. Hagerman helped set up. Commissioner 
Burke requested that Hagerman preside over the council. Apparently he saw no conflict 
of interest in Hagerman heading this council, while also being the chair of the PLB. 
Burke stated that each Pueblo would send two delegates to meetings, and, where 
factionalism existed, opposing parties would both be represented. 
The APC, however, already represented the Pueblos through a very similar 
format. The key difference was that the APC was independent of outside control. At an 
 
118 Rusco, A Fateful Time, 25. 
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APC meeting on 6 October 1926, Collier addressed the council and articulated his 
opinion: that the new council was a direct attempt to subvert the APC and its historic 
independence. The APC responded at this meeting by reasserting their legitimacy to 
negotiate without federal approval. Headed by Abeita, a committee drew up a short set of 
written by-laws explaining how the council functioned. “The purpose of this 
organization,” stated the committee, “is to promote the welfare of the Pueblo Indians and 
their good relations with their white neighbors and to enable them to stand united.”119 
The by-laws agreed that every Pueblo is eligible to vote at the APC, and could send as 
many delegates as they wished to each APC meeting. Significantly, each Pueblo was 
allowed only one vote, confirming the APC as equally representative of all Pueblos. The 
APC hoped that these by-laws—in many ways its first constitution—would force the 
Indian Office to concede that the APC was a sovereign, functioning, and representative 
inter-Pueblo government.  
The APC could not stop the first meeting of the Indian Office council on 15 
November 1926. At this meeting, Hagerman presided over matters, setting the agenda 
and controlling its direction. Many members of the APC attended, including Abeita and 
Joe Luhan of Taos. Hagerman explicitly told the attending delegates, many of whom 
were suspicious of his intentions, that the Indian Office would not recognize any Pueblo 
meeting as official unless representatives of the U.S. government were present.120 He 
named the new organization the United States Pueblo Indian Council. And while he 
stated directly that this new Indian Office–run council would not necessitate the end of 
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the APC, the traditional delegates still considered the meeting a blatant attempt to 
convince the Pueblo governors to abandon their traditional council.  
Abeita protested: “We come here like blind men and do not know what was going 
to be done. I would ask the chairman what the real object of this meeting is.”121 
Hagerman responded that many Pueblo-related issues needed resolving, not least the link 
between the government and the Indians. Francis Wilson was also present. Seemingly 
dismissing the role of the APC, he told the delegates, “In past years we had no such thing 
as this and we had to guess at what the pueblos wanted.”122 Showing a lack of 
understanding of the process of Indian and Pueblo government, Hagerman asked the 
delegates to decide on an array of issues while in the meeting. Abeita responded: “If it 
was only me they could finish the business in fifteen minutes. But I have to consider 
1000 people at home.” Similarly, Lujan said, “We cannot decide this matter until we have 
talked it over with our council.”123
Quite prophetically, during the meeting a strong gust of wind displaced the 
chimney on the roof of the building, sending debris onto three of the delegates below. 
Abeita was hurt by falling vigas.124 Antonio Lujan later remembered that this event 
“scared us out” of the meeting and, perhaps, added to the Pueblos’ reluctance to return to 
the United States Pueblo Indian Council. Similarly, the delegates realized that when 
Hagerman appointed Frank Paisano of Laguna as the future chairman of the council 
without any discussion, “we were on the wrong road.” 125 At an APC meeting a couple of 
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weeks after the first Hagerman-run council meeting, the APC denounced Hagerman’s 
body as a trap and, with the exception of Abeita, vowed to boycott further meetings.126 
The APC members reiterated that they were representative of the Pueblo community by 
individually announcing how they came to be at APC meetings. All delegates declared 
that they were sent by their respective tribal councils. Chairman Ortiz stated that the APC 
was not fighting against the government but was simply “fighting for our rights and we 
want to retain our ancient customs and form of government in our Pueblos.” Similarly the 
APC expressed their thanks to those non-Indians whom they considered their real friends, 
who did not do “just what they wanted; they have done what we wanted, what we told 
them to do.”127 The APC unanimously voted that all negotiations between the Pueblos 
and the Indian Office should be through the APC. And in April 1929, the APC drafted a 
letter sent to the Indian Office expressing “the honest hope that you may meet with us in 
council. We will be glad to call a meeting of the council at any time that you may desire, 
to discuss any matters with the pueblos as a group.” 128
The APC did not wish to cut ties with the Indian Office; they merely wanted to 
meet at a forum controlled by all the Pueblos. And while the U.S. Pueblo Indian Council 
met again in November 1927, delegates from only eight Pueblos attended. The majority 
of those attendees were not associated with the APC. An APC member later declared that 
the United States Pueblo Indian Council appeared to be operating in an underhanded 
manner, and felt there was no need to attend. He stated, “Our own council meetings are 
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powerful enough to carry on transactions with Washington.”129 Indeed at a meeting in 
September 1929, the newly appointed Indian commissioner, Charles Rhoades, attended 
an APC meeting, where he witnessed delegates denouncing the U.S. Council and voting 
to recognize the APC as the “official body through which business of the Pueblos should 
be transacted with the government.”130
With little support from the Pueblos or the Indian Office, the United States Pueblo 
Indian Council soon faded into obscurity. Once again, the APC was able to resist being 
overtaken by an outside organization. Further, through the efforts of traditional leaders to 
defend the APC as the representative confederate council of New Mexico’s nineteen 
Pueblos, the APC soon became the first point of contact for the Indian Office. The 
persistence of the APC—even while defending tradition—protected the Pueblos from the 
disintegration of their political and cultural structures.  
The Bursum-bill fight and the eventual passing of the Pueblo Lands Board Act 
were a major success for the APC in protecting the Pueblos’ way of life. In the process of 
defending their homelands, the APC had made a staunch ally in Collier. Their experience 
with him and other non-Indian organizations taught Pueblo governors the value of outside 
organizations when they were co-opted carefully. Ultimately, the APC grew as a body, all 
the while achieving success in securing their land base and ending decades of land-based 
consternation. And while the APC and its members had to defend their role in Pueblo life 
and politics—sometimes in the face of a barrage of criticism—the experience of 
defending Pueblo tradition through the APC allowed the council to secure respect as an 
inter-Pueblo organization. The result was that by the end of the 1920s, the APC had 
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become a cooperative body, not an insular one. Further, the APC had also become a 
responsive organization that was capable of negotiating the difficulties of twentieth-
century America. Certainly the Pueblos’ difficulties in the twentieth century did not end 
when Congress passed the PLB—far from it. But the APC entered the 1930s as a robust, 
outward-facing organization, competent at negotiating at the state and federal level. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The All Pueblo Council in the Pueblo Lands Board Era: Water, Jurisdiction, and the 
Indian Reorganization Act, 1928–1940 
 
 The ownership and use of land and water in many ways defined day-to-day life 
for New Mexico’s nineteen Pueblos in the early-to-mid-twentieth century. When the APC 
convinced Congress to pass the Pueblo Lands Board Act, this law was far from the end of 
the story and there was no time for the Pueblos to celebrate their success. At the end of 
the 1920s, the deteriorating ecological condition of New Mexico’s rivers, particularly the 
state’s main artery, the Rio Grande, led to a sharp decline in the agricultural use of the 
state’s water. In 1928, the newly established Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District 
(MRGCD)—which aimed to help the Anglo, Hispanic, and Indian residents of the state’s 
valleys—began working on the lands of six Pueblos in an effort to regulate water use and 
control flooding on the historic river. Similarly, in 1935, after he had merged the 
Pueblos’ Indian offices into the United Pueblos Agency (UPA), Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs John Collier instituted a period of close cooperation between the Office of Indian 
Affairs and the Office of Agriculture. Led by Dr. Sophie Aberle, the UPA began to 
expand its role in maintaining Pueblo land and water use and presided over Pueblo Lands 
Board (PLB) settlements. 
 Due to the activism surrounding the Pueblo Lands Board Act, the APC was at this 
time particularly alert to the threats facing the Pueblos. When these outside bodies, 
concerned primarily with Pueblo water issues, began interacting with the Pueblos and the 
APC, they reshaped the day-to-day realities of Pueblo life up and down New Mexico’s 
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rivers. The sheer number of new bodies had the potential to overwhelm the sovereignty 
of the Pueblos to govern their water-based issues, for land and water management 
became a jurisdictional nightmare. As the single Pueblo organization that faced outwards, 
the APC had to grapple quickly with these new bodies in order to maintain control over 
Pueblo affairs and protect the Pueblos’ access to their river-based lifeblood. The APC 
gradually became the middle-man for the negotiations between Pueblos and those 
organizations imposing new rules on water in New Mexico. Only by the APC confronting 
these organizations and inserting a Pueblo voice into the equation, did the Pueblos 
maintain some authority over their own water rights. 
 Arising in the midst of these local questions over Pueblo land and water in New 
Mexico was an issue of national importance for Indian Country. In 1933, President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt installed Collier to the position of Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs. Collier proposed returning a strong degree of self-government to tribes and 
ending the Dawes allotment act. Collier’s landmark legislation, the Indian Reorganization 
Act (IRA), marked a crucial philosophical turning point in Indian-white relations across 
the country. It essentially promised to end the destructive period of cultural assimilation 
and land displacement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The legislation 
allowed each tribe to draw up a constitution or charter, which, in theory, would return 
self-government to tribes. 
 Collier introduced the IRA to the APC at a meeting at Santo Domingo in March 
1934. The Pueblo leaders deemed the legislation more than palatable but, ultimately, only 
one Pueblo adopted an IRA constitution by the end of the decade. The IRA offered little 
to the Pueblos’ already strong political institutions. The day-to-day realities for the APC 
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during the PLB era revolved around protecting and improving their water sources, 
developing new irrigable land, negotiating with the UPA in practical matters, and 
ensuring that Pueblo Land Board settlements were fair. Put simply, adopting IRA 
constitutions was less important to Pueblo councils across New Mexico than mastering 
their negotiations with the UPA, MRGCD, and other irrigation and agricultural programs. 
Despite the APC’s support for Collier’s Indian self-government reforms (in principle), in 
reality the confederate council had little reason, and too many distractions, to pressure 
their home Pueblos to adopt IRA constitutions or charters. 
 This chapter aims to explain the Pueblo experience of the PLB era, 1928–1940, 
by exploring how the APC dealt with the emergence of the MRGCD, the UPA, and 
subsidiary bodies concerned with land and water-based improvements. By examining the 
Pueblos’ experience through the APC during this time, I hope to show that regional 
conditions defined the late 1920s and 1930s for New Mexico’s nineteen Pueblos. 
Similarly I hope to explain that regional water-related concerns marginalized the 
significance of the IRA for the Pueblos. While this policy dominated national Indian 
policy in the 1930s, and was proved a watershed in Indian history, land and water truly 
determined Pueblo futures during the PLB era.  
 In 1933, Collier claimed the “pueblos of New Mexico have more control over 
their own affairs than any other Indians.”131 In a national context, the period leading up to 
Collier’s selection as commissioner of Indian affairs was already a marked change from 
the explicit assimilation policies of the early twentieth century. The actions of reformers 
like Collier and Atwood was complemented by sympathetic groups, such as the Indian 
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Rights Association. Even though these organizations often tried to involve themselves in 
the internal dynamics of Pueblo affairs—much to the chagrin of the APC—their interest 
in Indians nonetheless influenced Indian policy. In 1926, in response to this political 
pressure, Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work called for a “comprehensive survey of 
Indian affairs.” Published in 1928, the report found “deplorable conditions in health, 
education, and economic welfare,” which reformers like Collier used “as a whip with 
which to chastise the government for its mismanagement of Indian affairs.” Prucha notes 
that the Hoover administration (1929–1933), was transitional for Indian policy. Under the 
direction of Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Rhoades, the Indian Office “pointed 
the way to a new future.” And while the Hoover administration “failed to revolutionize 
Indian affairs,” there was nonetheless a growing federal recognition that the condition of 
the nation’s wards was unacceptable.132
Illustrative of the declining condition for Indians nationwide was the agricultural 
situation faced by the Pueblos in New Mexico. One of the aims of the Pueblo Lands 
Board Act was to award the tribes compensation, which they could use to increase tribal 
landholdings. And in 1924, the PLB took its first action by awarding Tesuque Pueblo 
$29,000. PLB deliberations continued for a decade, and while the APC was more-or-less 
satisfied with the general principles of the Pueblo Lands Board Act—especially as the 
PLB began distributing significant monetary compensation to many Pueblos—Pueblo 
leaders remained vigilant against potential new threats to their agriculturally based 
world.133 As historian James Vlasich has pointed out, “agriculture has defined the 
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Pueblos throughout their history.” During the Spanish and then Anglo colonization of the 
Southwest, “non-Indian minds” applauded the “industry, stability, prosperity, legality, 
and technology” associated with the Puebos’ sedentary agricultural lifestyle.134 
Colonizers associated the Pueblos’ very agricultural foundation with civilization, and this 
perception helped shield the Pueblos from the most-destructive elements of the removal 
and reservation policies of the nineteenth century. 
 By 1920, the Pueblos’ cultural practices and political institutions were perhaps 
more intact than those of tribes elsewhere in Indian Country, especially when compared 
to those of the Plains tribes. The Pueblos’ ability to prosper was still threatened, however, 
because of their reliance on river water for agriculture. In 1920, the middle Rio Grande 
valley was in a “woeful state.” After “Centuries of irrigation from numerous primitive 
ditches,” the Rio Grande water table stood at over 90 percent of the valley floor, 
alkalizing the soil and destroying the nutrients capable of fueling food growth. Ironically, 
in a place where water was in short supply, the valley was often waterlogged and had 
turned to marshland. Consequently, between 1850 and 1920, while the population of 
Anglo and Hispanic residents legitimately or illegitimately using Rio Grande waters 
increased, the total agricultural acreage from White Rock Canyon in the north to Elephant 
Butte reservoir in the south declined by over two thirds.135  
 
claims and the APC also pressed the federal government to increase the financial 
compensation they received, per acre. This was eventually rectified in the Pueblo Relief 
Act in 1933. For a complete compensation chart, broken down to individual pueblos, see 
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 In 1923, concluding that the Rio Grande required drainage and flood control if it 
were to continue to support its inhabitants, the state of New Mexico enacted a 
Conservancy Bill. And while this decision was made primarily for the benefit of non-
Indian agriculturalists based in Albuquerque, the Pueblos’ land, too, was in need of 
attention. In 1928, the Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos—Cochiti, Santo Domingo, San 
Felipe, Santa Ana, Sandia, and Isleta—were cultivating a little over eight thousand acres 
of land. Significantly, there was “no cultivatable land lying idle” for these Pueblos; their 
agricultural production had hit a glass ceiling while their population was slowly 
increasing. Further, the cultivatable land available for these six Pueblos was considered 
“insufficient for these Indians to make even a reasonable living on.”136 Martin Vigil, for 
example, remembered that during his Tesuque childhood in the 1910s, he planted small 
patches of wheat corn and exchanged the produce for clothing in towns like Santa Fe.137 
Thus, farming was not a large-scale and profitable enterprise for Tesuque Indians or any 
Pueblos of the middle Rio Grande. Instead, agriculture provided a means of subsistence 
and self-sufficiency for New Mexico’s Pueblos, and in many ways it was also the basis of 
their culture.  
In order to bring the Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos under the conservancy plan, 
the MRGCD, on behalf of the state, had to negotiate a contract with the Interior 
Department for the valley’s Indian inhabitants. Essentially at stake was the price the 
Pueblos would have to pay for the MRGCD work undertaken on Pueblo land. The 
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MRGCD proposed work that would include “flood protection, drainage, storage of water 
with a proper distribution system, and river control.”138 At an APC meeting in March 
1928, all Pueblos but San Juan rejected the idea of the MRGCD.139 After conservancy 
surveys took place, however, and the Indian Office looked into the matter, the MRGCD 
concluded that they could add a further 15,000 acres, or newly reclaimed lands, to the six 
Pueblos’ land as well as improving the 8,000 acres they already cultivated. Significantly, 
all other groups that fell under the MRGCD plan were in favor of the District’s plans. 
Without Pueblo support, the project could not move forward. 
The APC became the indicator of Pueblo support for the project. In APC meetings 
on 17 September and 2 December 1927, the council invited MRGCD engineers to discuss 
the provisions and decided it would endorse the MRGCD as long as it included 
“protective measures” for the Pueblos and did not threaten “the destruction of any Pueblo 
village now or in the future.”140 And at an APC meeting on 19 January 1928, the council 
came out as strongly in favor of the bill. The council drafted a resolution that stated their 
support “for the protection of Indian land and rights” but maintained they were against 
“any reimbursable debt . . . even as to newly reclaimed lands.” The APC-endorsed 
version of the bill passed through the U.S. Senate only to be changed significantly in the 
House.141 While the original bill proposed that the Pueblos be charged only for work 
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undertaken on the fifteen thousand “newly reclaimed lands,” the House version 
essentially added an extra half a million dollars of debt to the Pueblos, because it would 
also charge them for the eight thousand acres they already cultivated.  
The irony of charging the Pueblos for their own land was sharply articulated by 
Dr. W. J. Spillman of the Indian Office’s agricultural department at the hearings in 1928:  
the Indians were out in the Rio Grande valley before the white man ever came there 
and have every moral right to it. The white man came along and took the water 
away from them and now they go to work to develop the water which the Indians 
originally had and charge them for the water rights.142
 
After passing through the House, the revised bill returned to the Senate, where a 
Committee on Indian Affairs, chaired by sympathetic Sen. Lynn J. Frazier of North 
Dakota, looked over the changes. Collier attended the Senate hearings to represent the 
Pueblo position and all Rio Grande Pueblos—not only the middle six included directly 
in the MRGCD—authorized him to speak on their behalf.143 The whole Pueblo 
community was invested in the outcome of the MRGCD, which threatened to rob the 
Pueblos of their collective right to govern their own water rights. Long-time APC 
chairman Sotero Ortiz sent a telegram to the Senate hearings in a last ditch plea to stop 
the bill: “We Pueblos will be ruined if debt of one and one-half millions [sic] placed 
on our lands . . . We kindly ask that . . . [the] conservancy bill be recalled and 
considered. This is desire all Pueblos [sic], which is the truth.”144 Collier made a 
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robust defense of the Pueblo position and insisted that the Senate should amend the 
legislation back to its original form. He also pointed out that these changes meant the 
Pueblos would be saddled with debt at a higher rate per acre than those non-Indian 
parties benefiting from MRGCD work.145 Despite the Pueblos’ opposition to the new 
version of the bill and the obvious objections of the committee chair Frazier, who 
voted against the measure, the committee voted in favor of the MRGCD, seven votes 
to four. 
 The outcome of the legislation was not particularly favorable to the Pueblos and 
the APC was unable to negotiate for the Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos an ideal position 
within the MRGCD, even with substantial outside help.146  However, the APC did 
support the project in principle, and that position may have harmed the council’s ability 
to achieve the exact terms they preferred. Further, in the long term the MRGCD did not 
work closely with the APC; more often than not, the Indian Office remained a more 
crucial partner to the Pueblos. 
By 1931, the MRGCD had begun work on diversion dams in Cochiti and Isleta. 
Similarly, the PLB continued to sort through individual land claims adjoining Pueblo 
land. On a national level the issues of Indian land and water had become crucial 
conversations in Indian Affairs after the publication of the Meriam Report. In response to 
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the political pressure the report created, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, still 
chaired by Senator Frazier, was authorized to investigate and inquire into “the condition 
of the Indians throughout the United States” in 1931.147 Significantly for the APC, on 6 
May 1931, the committee traveled to Santo Domingo Pueblo, where the APC hosted the 
touring senators. Pablo Abeita welcomed the committee: “We hereby turn the All-Pueblo 
Council over to you so that you may go ahead and proceed with anything pertaining to 
the welfare of us Pueblo Indians.”148 The majority of Pueblo comments, delivered almost 
exclusively by the members of the APC, was directed toward land and water issues.  
APC delegates critiqued the ongoing work of the PLB and the MRGCD. At a 
meeting a few days before the congressmen arrived at Santo Domingo, the APC had 
organized a campaign to increase Pueblo compensation from the PLB. The council 
formed an ad-hoc committee, composed of Pablo Abeita, Antonio Mirabal (Taos), and 
Sotero Ortiz to argue—for individual Pueblos and all Pueblos collectively—for an 
increase in the PLB compensation from Congress. At the hearings, Sotero Ortiz 
remarked, “We are not satisfied with the [Pueblo Lands Board] Act. . . . We have not 
been compensated the value of our lost land.”149 In 1933 the Pueblos’ pressure paid off. 
Collier’s first legislative success as Indian commissioner was the passage of the Pueblo 
Relief Bill. This legislation built on the Pueblo Lands Board Act by increasing the total 
Pueblo compensation from $621,000 to over $1.3 million. The Pueblo Relief Act 
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demonstrates the success of the APC’s collective cry for an increase in compensation at 
Santo Domingo.150
Beyond PLB issues, the MRGCD took center stage. Porfirio Montoya from Santa 
Ana, for instance, told the congressmen that too many roads, railroads, and now canals 
were being constructed on their land. And Santa Ana already had less land per capita than 
any other Pueblo in the MRGCD.151 Prompted by the intended plans of the MRGCD to 
carve up yet more land with a fresh canal, Montoya demanded that Congress pass 
legislation so that “anything that is built through Indian land . . . will be built so that it 
will be satisfactory to the Indians and . . . not put any more expense on the Indians in lost 
crops or labor.”152 Explaining the situation at Isleta, Pablo Abeita stated that much of the 
newly reclaimed land is “hard soil. . . . A lot of it is in bosk and a lot of it is in sand hills 
and high places.”153 He requested that the government level the land so that it would be 
fit for cultivation. APC members made dozens of other specific requests to the 
committee. 
The demands and concerns of the Pueblo leaders on issues of land highlights the 
greater significance of the event to the APC. Hosting a senatorial committee at Santo 
Domingo served notice of the growing influence of the confederate council. The traveling 
senators also visited Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Taos in New Mexico to discuss similar 
problems with other tribes. At Santo Domingo, however, the traditional home of the 
APC, the senators gauged the mood of the APC. The meeting in Santo Domingo and the 
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input of the Pueblo leaders on their home ground signifies the important role the APC 
played at this time in helping to resolve Pueblo land and water issues.  
MRGCD-related practical considerations remained tantamount to Pueblo 
priorities and APC meetings became the forum for the Pueblos to attempt to resolve these 
issues. At a two-day APC meeting in early July 1933, for instance, Diego Abeita 
illustrated the problems individual Pueblos faced in their dealings with MRGCD work. 
Abeita explained that the MRGCD was “aloof” from the Pueblos and “unwilling to 
understand our methods [for conservancy].” He went on to give an example in which the 
district “put in an intake on the worst ditch. Isleta informed the engineers that it would 
silt over in a year unless they eliminated a certain elbow on their drainage canal.” While 
the MRGCD undoubtedly had excellent engineering knowledge, they would not work 
closely or collaboratively with Isleta men who had worked on the ditches for generations. 
“We have tried to coordinate with them,” Abeita maintained, but “they refuse that.”154 
Elsewhere, San Felipe complained that the MRGCD employees felled trees on Pueblo 
land but refused to pay for them, despite their contractual obligation to do so. And at 
Santo Domingo, the MRGCD allegedly took gravel without Pueblo consent, while 
employing “Mexican” men for work on Pueblo property.155 The MRGCD contract 
required it employ only Pueblos on Pueblo projects. The APC was clearly unhappy with 
MRGCD infractions on their sovereign soil. 
While the APC continued to grow as a source of Pueblo voice, the Indian Office 
necessarily remained crucial to the Pueblos’ achieving change. Before 1935, the nineteen 
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Pueblos were under the jurisdiction of the Northern, Southern, and Zuni Pueblo agencies. 
As Collier, who at this time was operating outside the Indian Office, recognized, “The 
Indian Bureau Irrigation office stands, as it were, between the pueblos and the [Middle 
Rio Grande Conservancy] District.”156 Working alongside these agencies provided the 
APC and its delegates a means to gain influence with important players in the Indian 
Office. APC meetings were increasingly attended by Indian Office personnel, who 
realized the necessity and utility of corresponding closely with the APC. For instance, at 
the APC meeting in July 1933, H. C. Nueffer, a supervising engineer for the Indian 
Office’s irrigation district, and Robert H. Rupkey, assistant engineer for the Southern 
Pueblos Agency, joined Southern and Northern Pueblos Agency superintendents L. A. 
Towers and Chester Faris to help deal with land and water issues for all Pueblos. Despite 
their long-held suspicion of the Indian Office, APC leaders respected the work of Towers 
and Faris. Various Pueblos voiced their approval of the agricultural work they were doing 
on behalf of the Pueblos. Roland Duran of Picuris Pueblo stated that Faris had been 
particularly attentive to the remote mountain Pueblo’s needs.157 Towers and Faris, along 
with the Indian Office engineers, played a crucial supervising role in helping the Pueblos 
deal with the MRGCD. Despite the APC’s emergence as the space for the Pueblos to 
negotiate with and exert their influence over outsiders on their own terms, the council’s 
very limited resources meant that achieving change in practical matters still required the 
work of the Indian Office. 
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The political landscape of Indian Country was changing progressively as the APC 
was busy negotiating with the MRGCD in New Mexico. By the end of the Hoover 
administration, “All the elements were in place for a complete revitalization of the Indian 
Bureau.” Only “a steady and determined person able to bring together a synthesis of ideas 
and actions” was required to articulate the concerns of those individuals involved with 
Indian affairs.158 Roosevelt won the presidential election over Hoover in 1932, and 
instituted a series of nationwide reforms, collectively known as the New Deal. Roosevelt 
aimed to put Americans to work, expand and modernize the country’s infrastructure, and 
pull the nation out of the Great Depression. Importantly for the Pueblos and Indian 
Country, was his new appointment of Collier as commissioner of Indian affairs. 
 It is difficult to imagine that the APC as a council could have had more respect for 
Collier, describing him in 1934 as “one of our best friends.” Diego Abeita (Isleta) nicely 
summarized their mutual relationship: “I can truly say that Mr. Collier has had a great 
part of his Indian education from the Pueblos. He has gathered the Indian knowledge; he 
has had to work with largely from his [sic] observances of the Pueblos, and if the Pueblos 
have been mistaken then Mr. Collier is mistaken also.”159 By 1934, Pueblo leaders were 
confident that any changes Commissioner Collier proposed would in no way threaten 
their well-being. After all, Collier patently valued tribal structures. Since 1922, the hard 
work of the council, and the allies they had made, particularly the now-powerful Collier, 
allowed Pueblo leaders and communities to feel relatively secure about their future in 
New Mexico. 
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After shepherding successfully the Pueblo Relief Bill through Congress, Collier 
spent  “much of 1933 . . . connecting the existing programs of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs with the new agencies that the New Deal was then creating.”160 For instance, 
using funds from the Civilian Conservation Corps, a New Deal program, Collier 
established an Emergency Conservation Work program, which provided Indians living on 
reservations with local jobs during the depression.161 Historians Vine Deloria Jr. and 
Clifford M. Lytle have asserted that Collier began involving federal agencies in 
reservation programs because “it would be much easier to secure landmark legislation [ie. 
the IRA], since more of the federal establishment would have a stake in the outcome.”162 
As evidenced here, however, Collier’s early work as commissioner involved more than 
merely the IRA. And the Pueblos were entangled in every aspect of these broad reforms. 
In New Mexico, Pablo Abeita worried that after Collier’s appointment, the 
Pueblos would now have to argue with their old friend, rather than embrace his 
assistance.163 And while Collier continued to work closely with the APC as Indian 
commissioner, some of his decisions were inevitably not well received by the Pueblos. 
One of his first steps was to merge many Indian Office jurisdictions into larger units in 
order to create more powerful institutions. He intended to give his local superintendents 
greater executive power over their jurisdictions, so that the Indian Office would be more 
responsive to local needs. Previously, local superintendents tended to be in or nearby 
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Indian communities. They lacked any executive power, however, and always had to 
confer with Washington, D.C., for any real action to be taken.164  
For the Pueblos, this meant that the Northern, Southern, and Zuni Pueblo agencies 
became the United Pueblos Agency led by Aberle, and headquartered in Albuquerque. 
Collier expanded the manpower of the agency so that it would include men and women 
working in specialized roles. As part of his wider national initiative, Collier also began a 
period of close cooperation between the Indian and Agricultural Offices for work on 
UPA lands, increasing the funds available to the Pueblos in the process. His ten years of 
experience with the Pueblos had taught Collier that responsible land use and maintenance 
was “fundamental to everything else if you are going to have a long future.”165 He 
instituted a nationwide cooperative program between the Indian Office and the Soil 
Conservation Service (SCS) under the Office of Agriculture in an effort to give Indians 
“a role in determining how conservation programs were to be operated on their 
reservations.”166 From 1935 onward the SCS began work on riverbank protection, ditch 
cleaning, and dams across Pueblo country. 
 As was the case with the MRGCD, the SCS also caused a degree of jurisdictional 
and practical confusion for the Pueblos. Martin Vigil, for example, brought to the APC a 
difficulty Tesuque was suffering due to a misunderstanding between the Irrigation 
Service and the Pueblo.167 And in an effort to stop soil erosion between 1935 and 1936, 
the SCS constructed an arroyo diversion at Sandia, a dam at Laguna, riverbank protection 
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at Nambe, spreader dykes at Acoma, an arroyo at Laguna, and a diversion dam at Cochiti, 
among other projects. Yet in almost every case, these projects failed with the first 
significant rainstorm floods of the season. A UPA report suggested that “absolutely no 
engineering or construction ability or knowledge were used in this work.”168  
These failings naturally brought Aberle under pressure from the APC early in her 
tenure. She conceded, “We have had to get used to working with many different 
people.”169 The APC and the Pueblos were already disgruntled that they had lost their 
good friends, superintendents Faris and Towers. Some members of the Taos delegation 
felt that Aberle, as a woman, was an inappropriate choice for leading the UPA. Charlie 
Kie, Martin Vigil, Pablo Abeita, and Diego Abeita, however, defended Aberle and 
mentioned her good work in helping Santa Clara write its IRA constitution.  
Despite the elaborate and overlapping work of the PLB, MRGCD, UPA, and SCS, 
then, the Pueblos land and water situation remained insecure. In March 1936, the APC 
sent a delegation to Washington, D.C., to testify in front of a congressional committee on 
Indian Affairs regarding the land situation in New Mexico. Martin Vigil, Charlie Kie, 
Antonio Abeita, and John Bird (Santo Domingo), while not entirely happy with the help 
they had received from outside organizations, appealed for more land for the Pueblos and 
further assistance with agriculture and grazing. Under Collier’s recommendation they 
also appealed for continuing funding for the cooperative work of the SCS and Emergency 
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Conservation Work.170 The vocal leaders of the APC at this time, such as Vigil, Kie, 
Diego Abeita, and Pablo Abieta, defended Aberle and the work of the UPA. While the 
UPA was a centralized body representing all Pueblos, in many ways similar to the APC, 
the APC delegates recognized that the council exerted little executive power. They thus 
acknowledged the potential benefits of an organization wielding the power of the UPA 
could bring the Pueblos. The APC was able to exert pressure on the UPA via Collier’s 
relationship with Aberle. Indeed, Aberle claimed she was very well treated by the 
Pueblos because Collier had hand-picked her as UPA superintendent. The Pueblo leaders’ 
close relationship with Collier meant that the UPA was particularly responsive to APC 
concerns. 
 The UPA managed to achieve some success for the Pueblos in terms of land 
management under Aberle. By the time she assumed control of the UPA, the Pueblos’ 
land base was already growing due to land purchases that were paid for by PLB 
compensation. Indeed fifteen Pueblos (not including Acoma, Zuni, and Zia) eventually 
added 47,054 acres to their land base with PLB money.171 During this time, other 
opportunities arose for the Pueblos to increase their land base because, under the terms of 
the IRA, the secretary of the interior was authorized to acquire additional lands for 
reservations.172 At Acoma, for instance, the tribe took advantage of the land acquisition 
program to purchase 27,247 acres within their reservation. A raft of other New Deal 
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agencies or acts—including the Submarginal Lands Board, Federal Surplus Relief 
Corporation, Federal Emergency Relief Administration, and Bankhead-Jones Act—also 
led to significant land gains that enlarged the size of the Pueblos’ land.173 The UPA 
supervised these proceedings.  
Before the Pueblos had uncontested use of their newly acquired and old land, 
however, Aberle “aggressively sought settlements to finish the work begun by the Pueblo 
Lands Board in 1924, clearing claims against Indian land.”174 After finally removing all 
non-Indian settlers from Pueblo lands, as determined by the PLB, Aberle announced that 
all PLB lands had been cleared in 1938. The work of the PLB, MRGCD, and New Deal 
legislation resulted in the Pueblos securing approximately 667,500 acres of new land 
between 1934 and 1944. They had increased their land base by 50 percent.175 These land 
gains were was not an unqualified success, however. For example, MRGCD work 
increased the Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos’ land by over thirteen thousand acres. Yet 
many of the Pueblos had neither the technology nor the need to capitalize on this tripled 
land acreage.176 Similarly, because local non-Indians were reluctant to sell irrigated land 
to Pueblos, only 2,869 of 47,054 total acres of land purchased by the Pueblos using PLB 
funds were irrigated. In the arid valleys of New Mexico, land without irrigation was 
virtually useless for agricultural purposes. 
By 1935, the Pueblos had to contend and negotiate with multiple Indian Office 
agents, and a myriad of conservancy and irrigation bodies, while corresponding closely 
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with their attorneys to ensure that the work of the PLB was producing favorable 
outcomes. This was undoubtedly a transformative period for the APC, who often found it 
difficult to distinguish the MRGCD from the Indian Office irrigation division. Pueblo 
communities often considered federal administration to be arbitrary and confusing. Yet 
despite these struggles, the APC had become the forum for Pueblo negotiations with 
outside organizations by the mid 1930s. As an example, an APC meeting in April 1936 
was attended by representatives of eighteen Pueblos (Zuni was absent due to poor road 
conditions); the commissioner of Indian affairs; the UPA superintendent; field 
representatives and Irrigation Division officials from the Indian Office; and Pueblo 
attorney William Brophy (who later succeeded Collier at the Indian Office). Certainly, 
this cooperation reflects the changes Collier instituted within the Indian Office and across 
Indian Country. Only ten years earlier, the Indian Office had attempted to undermine the 
authority of the APC by creating a rival council. Yet in 1936, the APC was hosting the 
most important men and women of the Indian Office, working closely with them to solve 
Pueblo matters. This change demonstrates both the national shift in valuing tribal 
political structures and the APC’s growing willingness to work with outsiders to increase 
their regional power. 
That the Pueblos could meet together and host outsiders was significant. The APC 
began to realize that increasing the breadth of input from outsiders was helpful to their 
day-to-day and long-term objectives. APC delegates also began to show increasing 
sophistication with regard to the political process. Eli Beardsley of Laguna during this 
time referred to the U.S. constitution to demonstrate that “in union there is power. If we 
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stand together, united, we can [succeed].”177 Still, the APC remained wary of excluding 
older and more traditional leaders from its consultation with outsiders. The conservative 
Santo Domingo Pueblo was invariably the host of APC meetings, and their entire council 
often attended APC meetings. In 1933, Augustine Aguilar of Santo Domingo described 
the difficulties he faced in helping his councilmen understand the wider concept of 
working with outsiders:  
I have been a member of the [All Pueblo] Council for fourteen years. I have 
attended every meeting we have had with the Conservancy and your Engineers, and 
everyone in the room knows me as a member of the Council, and I am representing 
the pueblo here. I talk for my Council men here and interpret for them everything 
you say, although it is a very hard job for me to make these old people understand 
your ways.178
 
While the APC was certainly transitioning into a more responsive body that hoped to 
protect and adapt to the changing circumstances of the twentieth century, the council 
remained wary of the need to maintain the traditional hierarchy of Pueblo society. 
Considering the bevy of negotiations that the APC had to contend with at this 
time, it is easy to forget that across Indian Country, Collier’s proposed IRA dominated 
the 1930s. Owing to his close work with the Pueblos and other tribes across the country, 
Collier’s legislation aimed to return to tribes a degree of self-government that was 
previously unparalleled. Title I of the legislation allowed tribes to draw up constitutions 
and charters that had the ability to protect them from outside interference by putting them 
on a stable legal footing. Also available was more financial aid for tribes and the ability 
to assume gradually responsibility from the Indian Office for certain functions. The 
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legislation was intended to produce “the progressive transfer of municipal functions to 
the organized tribe.”179 The IRA also attempted to end the Dawes Allotment Act, 
improve Indian education, and establish Indian courts.  
 On 15 March 1934, in the council hall of Santo Domingo Pueblo, the APC 
discussed the relative merits of the proposed IRA and how it would affect the Pueblos. 
Taos delegate Antonio Mirabal declared, “We are not going to fight against ourselves. . . . 
We are in favor of this bill.” In the presence of Collier, Diego Abeita lauded the spirit of 
the legislation: “The Bill embodies many policies that have been advocated and voiced 
by the All-Pueblo Council for many years.” Chairman Ortiz urged the governors of the 
Pueblos to take advantage of the bill, believing that “now is the time for us to take the 
protection we have been asking for.”180 After the meeting had concluded, each individual 
Pueblo council gave the IRA due consideration, and all but Jemez approved of Collier’s 
national plans to return a degree of self-government to tribal councils and end the 
destructive results of the Dawes Allotment Act. Yet despite the apparent enthusiasm 
these men expressed, by the end of the decade only Santa Clara Pueblo had taken 
advantage of the IRA by acting on its central provision and adopting a constitution. Why 
did almost all Pueblos choose not to adopt legislation that aimed to return self-
government to tribes while increasing land rights—two of the most pertinent issues for 
the Pueblos? 
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 Historian Graham Taylor concludes that the IRA aimed “to promote forms of 
community self-determination enabling Indians to function in a modern economic 
environment within the framework of their own traditional cultural institutions.”181 For 
the Pueblos, merging their traditional institutions into modern governmental formations 
while protecting their historic sovereignty was not feasible. The APC felt that the general 
principles of the IRA were acceptable and would help protect the sovereignty of the 
Pueblos. As Orlando Durand of Picuris noted, however, “It is very simple to talk, but it is 
pretty hard to fulfill. . . . We all desire to preserve our pueblo traditions and our pueblo 
rights and to obey our officers.”182 While supportive of the IRA in principle, he believed 
the reform could potentially empower the governor instead of the caciques or war 
captains who were charged with maintaining the continuity of Pueblo life. Sotero Ortiz, a 
man particularly respectful of tradition himself, said that he tried to engage his tribal 
council in a discussion on the IRA, but was told “nothing doing.”183 Quite simply, many 
of the more traditional Pueblo leaders neither understood, nor particularly cared to 
understand, the provisions of the IRA. The APC itself was composed of predominantly 
traditional leaders who had been elected governors or delegates to the APC by their 
traditional councils. The work and cooperation of the APC with outsiders, though, meant 
little to the more conservative tribal councilmen who were concerned that the IRA was an 
unnecessary intrusion on their political institutions. Despite his support of the IRA, even 
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the fairly progressive Pablo Abeita stated, “I hope that I will be seven feet under the 
ground when my people start voting.”184
Collier realized the quandary the Pueblos were in. “How can we draw up 
constitutions,” he asked, “which can be adopted by a Pueblo without in any way 
shattering the traditional system?” 185  After discussion with the APC and despite their 
enthusiasm, at least superficially, the IRA’s chief architect conceded that if the Pueblos 
could not form a way to adopt constitutions without disturbing “the old institutions, then 
you oughtn’t to have it.”186 Indeed the only Pueblo to adopt an IRA constitution in the 
1930s was Santa Clara, which had been deeply divided for many decades by internal 
disputes between four rival factions.187 For Santa Clara, the IRA offered an opportunity 
to construct a stable political structure. For the majority of the other Pueblos, however, 
reforming or formalizing their stable self-government did not seem a particularly pressing 
or necessary issue. Combined with the changing dynamics that day-to-day life in the late 
1920s and early 1930s entailed, and despite their trust in Collier, it becomes easy to 
understand why the Pueblos almost universally chose not to adopt IRA constitutions in 
the 1930s. The Pueblos believed that the IRA had little potential to boost their 
sovereignty, and thus they almost universally rejected IRA constitutions. 
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Despite the constant struggle the Pueblos faced in the Pueblo Lands Board era to 
maintain land and water rights, and thus preserve the basis of their culture, it was 
nonetheless a transformative period for the APC. Historians have debated the merits and 
long-term impact of Collier’s IRA reforms. What seems clear is that the political 
momentum he created, due to his respect for Indian self-government, allowed the APC to 
establish itself as an organized political confederate council. When Collier eventually left 
office in 1945, the momentum of his reforms diminished, and soon, Indian Country faced 
the potential for federal termination of their tribal status. Yet APC members gained a 
significant political education as leaders between 1928 and 1940. Martin Vigil, for 
example, went on to serve as APC chairman for ten years in the 1950s and protected the 
Pueblos from termination’s most destructive elements. Similarly, Diego Abeita built on 
his time with the council in the New Deal era by eventually representing the APC 
Irrigation Committee in midcentury battles over water rights.  Taylor states that during 
this time period, with the help of Collier, the APC moved “beyond representing the 
villages in a legal capacity in the courts and before Congress, as it had largely done in the 
previous decade.” Instead, the APC began to “take a more assertive role in internal 
matters affecting the pueblos generally,” for economic and administrative requirements 
“created some pressure for greater centralization of control.”188 The threats to Pueblo 
sovereignty, too, forced the APC to tighten its control of Pueblo affairs. 
For the nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico and their confederate council, the PLB 
era was dominated by negotiating with various state and federal institutions to defend and 
advance Pueblo land and water rights while protecting political sovereignty. The added 
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layers of bureaucracy from the MRGCD and Indian Office often caused confusion and 
battles over jurisdiction. More importantly, the various organizations began to impinge 
on the Pueblos’ control of their own water rights. The APC, however, became the front 
line in maintaining a semblance of Pueblo control over water-rights negotiations. Further, 
these issues allowed the APC to develop connections and political clout that would 
eventually protect them. This development was particularly aided by the political 
optimism that Collier’s time with the Pueblos had created. Local conditions often defined 
life on reservations and in Pueblos. The modern complexities of the twentieth century 
presented the Pueblos with fresh challenges that affected their everyday existence. By 
organizing around the APC, the Pueblos found the means to grapple slowly with their 
land and water situation in a rapidly evolving New Mexico. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Midcentury Transitions: The All Pueblo Council in Post–World War II America, 
1940–1962 
 
 In 1940, after leading the APC for almost two decades, Sotero Ortiz and Pablo 
Abeita stepped down as respectively APC chairman and secretary to make way for 
Joseph Tafoya of Santa Clara Pueblo and Abel Paisano of Laguna. Ortiz and Abeita had 
been present before and during the Bursum-bill fight. Their absence from the APC 
leadership represented a changing of the guards. Tafoya was chair for the next six years, 
but the activism of his leadership was hampered by the national and regional conditions 
caused by World War II. Before the end of the war, the landscape of Indian Country, 
including New Mexico’s nineteen Pueblos, changed dramatically. By the end of 1941, the 
New Deal programs of the previous decade had been replaced by wartime policies and 
resources were appropriately redirected away from Indian affairs. Early in 1945, before 
the war had ended, Collier resigned from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) after a long-
standing feud with Congress.189 World War II also drained Pueblo society of leadership 
during the war, as Pueblo men joined the U.S. military in droves. These men were of 
leadership age and tasted non-Pueblo life during their military experience. On their 
return, the industrial boom of the war continued across the United States and many 
Pueblo men chose to divide their time between non-Indian and Pueblo life. 
 
189 In 1947 the Office of Indian Affairs was renamed the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). 
I hereafter refer to this organization as the BIA. 
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 Suffering from the loss of Collier’s influence and a lack of cooperation from a 
resource-poor Indian Bureau, the APC went through a period of relative inactivity during 
and immediately after World War II. As chairmen of the APC, Tafoya and then Paisano 
struggled to sustain meaningful relationships with outside organizations. As federal 
Indian policy shifted toward assimilation and then termination, the BIA ceased to support 
tribal organizations as it had during Collier’s reign. The BIA was also low on manpower 
and the political clout required to react to the needs of the Pueblo population. 
 Only in the early 1950s, motivated by the potential impact of federal termination 
policies, did the APC once more sustain enthusiasm for a single pressing issue. The 
chairman during this time, Martin Vigil, fought termination while beginning to 
modernize the format and procedure of the APC, all the while corresponding closely with 
the BIA and other organizations. Vigil increased the executive authority of the APC 
chairman, limited APC input on religious matters, and formed more in-depth 
relationships with outsiders. Thus, despite the midcentury representing a transition for the 
APC and a lull in their activities, by the early 1960s, the Pueblos had avoided termination 
and sat in a healthy position to push for a greater degree of self-determination.  
 When the APC elected Tafoya chairman of the APC in May 1940, Indian 
Country’s enthusiasm for reform, originally sparked by Collier’s Indian New Deal, was 
already waning. Only 35 percent of Native American tribes voted to accept Collier’s 
vision of tribal government. Landless and politically weak Indians in California, the East, 
Oklahoma, and the Great Plains gained little from the IRA’s economic incentives. 190 
Many tribes were skeptical of the speed at which Collier implemented his vision of tribal 
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government, while others—including the Pueblos—could not consolidate modern 
governmental structures with traditional ones.191 Further, the nation’s most populous 
tribe, the Navajo Nation of New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah, fiercely resented the 
devastating impact of another of Collier’s policies: the Livestock Reduction Program. 
While the tribal reception of the Indian New Deal was only lukewarm, Collier was also 
deeply unpopular in Congress between 1937 and 1945. Described by Prucha as “a man 
besieged,” Collier was accused of being a communist and of working against the federal 
long-term goal of assimilating Indians into the mainstream.192 In 1937, Congress even 
attempted to repeal the IRA. 
 After the Japanese bombing of Peal Harbor in December 1941, the entrance of the 
United States into World War II immediately changed Congressional priorities. The BIA 
became one of the biggest casualties in the wartime political economy, and this drasic 
reduction forced Indian policymakers to take another step back from tribal entities. 
During the war, the BIA received both an “absolute loss of dollars” from Congress, as 
well as a disproportionate cut in funds “in comparison with other agencies.” In 1942, in 
an example of the newly peripheral nature of the BIA, the government moved the bureau 
from Washington, D.C., to Chicago. The following year the BIA’s funding was cut by 25 
percent.193
 The landscape of Indian Country changed dramatically during the war years. 
Alison R. Bernstein, a historian of the Indian experience during World War II, notes that 
as America moved closer to entering the war in 1940, the BIA issued a memorandum that 
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recommended “placing tribal resources at the government’s disposal.”194 This move 
essentially opened up Indian lands to the federal government for war purposes in the 
realm of food production and mineral extraction. Similarly, the BIA made its hospitals 
and education programs available for non-Indian uses. Historian Kenneth R. Philp has 
also suggested that the Selective Service Act—which did not discriminate against Native 
Americans—meant Indians were “no longer . . . classified as a separate group of 
citizens.”195 Outside military service, Indian life changed dramatically when a vast array 
of jobs near reservations sprang up to support the needs of the war. Many Indians not 
engaged in the military effort, and those willing to leave their homelands, began flocking 
to cities such as Albuquerque to fill vacant positions in industry and production.196 For 
the majority of Indian workers, war-time jobs were their first experience of a wage-based 
economy. 
 World War II also ushered in demographic shifts in Pueblo society. When Pueblo 
men began returning from fighting in overseas theaters, they had to decide whether to 
continue functioning within white society or to return to their homelands. Of the twelve 
hundred Pueblo men who fought abroad, by the end of 1945 six hundred had returned to 
their villages. And of these six hundred, the BIA reported that one-third planned to find 
work in Albuquerque.197
  These changes meant that during the war, many Pueblo people who normally 
would have participated in their Pueblo’s political process were instead exposed to the 
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values of white society. Those who ventured away from home were able to earn regular 
paychecks and taste the positive (and negative) aspects of mainstream society. Despite 
the potentially devastating impact of the loss of leadership-aged men, Pueblo society 
retained a core of its leaders and structures. And while precise figures of the demographic 
impact of the war are unknown, the Pueblo population grew by 15 percent between 1940 
and 1950.198 In 1946, many Pueblos held a weeklong festival to honor the contributions 
of their veterans in World War II.199 This was not the case at Zuni Pueblo, however, 
where returning veterans received a hostile reception from tribal elders. Because of their 
experience in the white world, elders considered the returning men impure and infected 
with the ills of white society. Consequently nearly seventy of the two hundred Zuni men 
who fought in the war soon left their home Pueblo.200
 Despite the difficulties of returning to Pueblo life, however, many men who had 
served in the military soon moved into leadership positions within Pueblo society. Well 
before World War II, Pueblo men who had fought in American wars had returned to their 
homelands to find leadership positions. APC chairman Tayofa, for example, fought in the 
Great War, while Abel Paisano served in the campaigns against Pancho Villa in Northern 
Mexico. World War II veterans such as Joe Sando (Jemez), Miguel Trujillo (Isleta), and 
Popovi Da (San Ildefonso), among others, returned to work in leadership positions with 
their respective Pueblos and the APC. Thus, while the APC certainly lacked men of 
leadership age during and immediately after WWII, in the long term many of these men 
reintegrated into Pueblo society and filled positions of leadership. As we shall see, 
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however, these men’s worldviews were frequently challenged and changed by their 
experience in white society.  
 Collier’s resignation as Indian commissioner was illustrative of the shifts in 
Indian policy that occurred during and after the War.201 For the APC, Collier’s 
resignation meant that they lost a valuable friend and ally. Similarly, his resignation 
represented the true end of the Indian New Deal and ushered in a new era of federal 
skepticism toward the tribal nature of Indian communities. In part because of American 
Indians’ contributions to the war effort, many lawmakers believed the nation’s original 
inhabitants ought to be treated like all other (white) Americans. Despite the optimism 
apparent in this opinion, the direction of Indian policy soon turned away from helping 
tribes, and toward the integration of Indians into American society. 
 In the mid 1940s, Congress passed the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) Act, 
which ultimately indicated the changing tide of Indian policy. In 1946 Congress 
established the ICC to settle tribes’ long-standing land claims. Some supporters of the 
bill—such as Collier, his successor William Brophy, and organizations supportive of 
tribal sovereignty—saw the bill as the final act of the Indian New Deal and believed the 
commission would force the government to live up to treaty obligations with its 
indigenous wards. Yet the ICC also received support from those who hoped to see the 
integration of Indians into wider society. These integrationists saw the ICC as a means to 
an end. By settling tribal claims, integrationists believed that not only would tribal 
members finally be free from their tribal structure, but the federal government’s 
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responsibility to its indigenous wards would be fulfilled.202 They felt that after receiving 
compensation, Native individuals would be free to join the wider American society. The 
direction of federal Indian policy, and the interpretation of the ICC, was crystallized in 
1948, when President Harry Truman’s Hoover Commission on Executive Reorganization 
recommended that federal policy support the full integration of Native Americans into 
wider society.203
 The limited resources of the BIA in WWII and the subsequent drive toward 
integrating Native Americans into wider society posed a number of challenges to the 
APC and its leaders. Jemez historian Joe Sando, who joined the Navy during World War 
II, remembered that the economic impact of the war caused a “dangerous shortage of 
personnel upon whom the Indian people relied.”204 One tangible loss for the Pueblos due 
to this decrease in available personnel was the reassignment of Aberle, the UPA director. 
In 1944, Aberle, who had a doctorate in anatomy, was transferred to the National Medical 
Research Center in Washington, D.C. 
 Due to the political and economic conditions caused by the war, the APC’s drive 
for sovereignty faltered. In many ways the APC’s main priority during this time became 
to ensure merely that the BIA’s limited funds continued to provide the Pueblo people 
with enough resources for food and education. After Santa Clara adopted an IRA 
constitution in 1935, the Pueblo elected Tayofa governor, and he soon began participating 
in APC meetings. Within five years, the APC had elected him chairman. Tafoya had to 
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lobby the BIA particularly hard during this period to avoid the impoverishment of Pueblo 
communities. There was a shortage of teachers at Indian schools in New Mexico, and 
Tafoya attempted to ensure that schools attended by Pueblo children were properly 
funded. Tafoya also worked within Pueblo society and, backed by the APC, directed that 
tribes should only allow Pueblo children to be withdrawn from school on special 
occasions. Previously, parents withdrew their children in the springtime to participate in 
sheep camps and fiestas. Similarly, the APC informed the local boarding schools that for 
Pueblo fiestas, students should only be absent for their home fiesta, once per year. As a 
graduate of Carlisle Indian School and as a member of the Winter moiety at Santa Clara, 
which believed ceremonial practice should not be compulsory, Tayofa aimed to ensure 
Pueblo children received a modern American education.205
 In October 1946, Abel Paisano of Laguna replaced Tafoya as APC chairman. 
Paisano was educated at Albuquerque Indian School and spent a considerable period of 
his life in the Duke city, working as a mechanic for the UPA. Some of the older Pueblo 
leaders looked on Paisano with suspicion because of his connections with the BIA, and 
the recent memory of Hagerman’s Indian Office run Pueblo council,.206 Still, Paisano 
spent his tenure as APC chairman attempting to reach across institutional divides. And 
although he could not unite the Pueblos into determined action, Paisano did achieve some 
success when he encouraged cooperation with outsiders. Due to his ties to the BIA, for 
example, Paisano secured the use of the Albuquerque Indian School auditorium for APC 
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meetings.207 This was not necessarily a popular measure among APC delegates. Indeed in 
1939, the APC had rejected the idea of moving away from their “time-honored capital” of 
Santo Domingo.208 And in 1943, Diego Abeita stated that “the Pueblos don’t feel free to 
express themselves while they are guests of the Indian Bureau,” because “they must 
always comply with the wishes of the Indian Bureau while they are on the Government 
Indian school grounds, or Indian Bureau property.”209 And while the APC operated 
independently from BIA control at AIS, the forum undoubtedly posed problems for more 
traditional delegates. 
 The council also weighed in on a range of other local issues. The APC had to deal 
with BIA cuts to local schools in 1947. The next year Paisano accused the federal 
government of discriminating against Indians in an attempt to overturn the continued ban 
of liquor sales to Native Americans.210 Paisano also hired James Stewart, the 
superintendent for the Navajos, to represent them before the ICC.211 Paisano’s chief 
success as APC chairman, however, was in conjunction with the BIA, when he helped 
secure the construction of the Bernalillo County-Indian Hospital in Albuquerque in 1952. 
Drawing on his relationship with Commissioner William Brophy, Paisano was selected to 
became a member of the hospital’s board of trustees in 1949. In June 1950, the APC 
unanimously backed the construction of the hospital and wired President Truman to 
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declare their support for the project. The APC helped convince the BIA to fund the 
project to the tune of $1.5 million. The total cost was over $3 million.212
 Ultimately, Paisano’s tenure was constrained by the national context of the time 
and Paisano was also conscious of the APC’s apparent lack of direction. He called an 
APC meeting in February 1947, and invited multiple members of the BIA to attend in an 
attempt to encourage greater participation between Pueblo governors and the BIA. “Lack 
of clear statements of Indian wants” noted Paisano, “has hampered the [All Pueblo] 
council.”213 Under Tafoya, the APC had begun paying Felix Cohen, a prominent attorney 
and architect of the Indian New Deal, to represent their interests in Washington, D.C, and 
to advise them on the actions of the BIA. However, in 1950, Cohen complained to the 
APC that they had not met frequently enough to stay abreast of events in the capitol. In 
particular, Cohen believed that the APC should have frequently visited Washington, D. 
C., to help him represent their interests. The APC paid Cohen $100 per month for his 
services, yet he reported that between July 1949 and October 1950, the APC did not 
meet, or, at least, report their meetings to him.214  
 Perhaps the primary difficulty the APC faced at this time was the lack of a single 
issue that necessitated a unified Pueblo response. Yet in 1948, the APC failed to act when 
presented with an opportunity to advance the rights of the Pueblos. In 1947, the 
President’s Committee on Civil Rights criticized the inability of Indians to vote in New 
Mexico and Arizona. Given that they had fought in World War II, the report read, Indians 
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were considered citizens, and that they were subject to an array of taxes (except for those 
lands held in trust), Indians should have full representation. On 14 June of the following 
year, Isleta-born Miguel Trujillo, a member of the APC who was educated at 
Albuquerque Indian School and Haskell Institute in Kansas, deliberately challenged his 
inability to vote. Having served as a Marine during World War II, Trujillo realized that 
Indians faced inherent discrimination in American society and, in New Mexico, were also 
disenfranchised. Thus he attempted to register to vote in Los Lunas, near Isleta Pueblo, 
but was refused on the grounds that Indians were not taxed. Trujillo then approached the 
APC in an attempt to convince them to back his cause.215 According to Sando, however, 
“there were still some old-timers on the council who were fearful of losing their lands 
and their autonomy,” and thus the APC did not weigh in on Trujillo’s case.216 
Undeterred, Trujillo still attempted to vote in the elections, and was consequently 
arrested. With the help of Cohen’s legal counsel, Trujillo sued the recorder of Valencia 
County, claiming that Indians in New Mexico paid a variety of taxes. His case reached 
the U.S. District Court of New Mexico. On 3 August 1948, in Trujillo vs. Garley, the 
court declared unconstitutional the sections of the New Mexico constitution that denied 
Indians the right to vote. Significantly, the verdict of the court was influenced by Trujillo 
and the wider Indian community’s military service during the war. The verdict concluded 
that the state’s Indian inhabitants were patriots, paid taxes, and thus deserved the right to 
vote.217  
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 Perhaps ironically, once the Pueblos had the right to vote, the APC unified 
quickly around their newly won franchise. After an eight-hour session at a meeting in 
Santo Domingo on 2 October, the APC issued a “strong plea for all eligible Indians to 
register” to vote. The addition of seventy-five hundred Pueblo voters of eligible age had 
the potential to impact significantly the direction of state elections. Indeed the Gallup 
Independent noted that for the 1948 election, the entrance of the Pueblo vote had the 
potential to decide the outcome of the state races. At this time, the APC refrained from 
endorsing any specific candidates—so as not to impinge on individual Pueblos’ 
independence from one another—but vowed that all Pueblo governors would receive 
APC-collected information on each candidate. 218 It is difficult to know exactly why the 
APC failed initially to get behind this issue, or to unite around another issue during this 
time. Certainly, WWII and its consequences, including the loss of Collier as Indian 
commissioner, combined with an unhelpful and resource-poor BIA to constrain the APC. 
Yet even when presented with the issue of Indian civil rights, the APC refrained from 
taking an official position.  
 Further complicating the APC and its policies in the postwar years was the 
formation of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI). The NCAI is a “truly 
Indian and truly national” Native American-run council, established in 1944, that in its 
infancy, “transcended IRA tribal councils.” 219 The NCAI hoped to capitalize on the 
changing dynamics of Indians in America by emphasizing both tribal and individual 
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rights for Native Americans. The NCAI did not have a single cause, however. Some 
members lobbied the council to help decrease the power of the BIA over tribes, and 
others hoped to legitimize tribal hiring of attorneys, while many championed Indians’ 
civil rights.220 Secretary of the APC, John Rainer (Taos), communicated with and 
directed policy for the NCAI, becoming in 1950 its first executive secretary. And while 
Rainer and Paisano worked together for the APC, their roles representing separate 
organizations with different agendas shaped their conceptions of leadership at home. 
 By 1950, the NCAI was advocating a “fundamental change in federal Indian 
policy,” which focused on curbing the authority of the BIA.221 Yet NCAI members did 
not necessarily agree on what this meant. For example, in early 1940, the NCAI accused 
John Crow (Cherokee), the superintendent on the Mescalero reservation who advocated 
IRA tribal structures, of interfering with the tribe’s self-determination. As executive 
secretary of the NCAI, Rainer charged the BIA of paternalism and deliberately restricting 
the self-determination of the Mescaleros. Rainer and others in the NCAI felt that tribes 
organized around IRA constitutions became pawns of the BIA, and he vented his 
disagreement with their refusal to reprimand Crow. Paisano, on the other hand, felt that 
special interest groups had used this situation to manipulate the NCAI into attacking the 
BIA, and, in particular, an Indian representative (Crow) of the bureau.222 While this 
narrative is complicated, importantly this event and the divide in opinion between 
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Paisano and Rainer clearly demonstrates the fragmented nature of national and Pueblo 
Indian politics at midcentury.223  
 In these early postwar years, the BIA expressed “widely divergent definitions” of 
Indian policy. 224 Similarly, the NCAI also experimented with different goals and tried to 
establish an identity as an organization. In Pueblo life, too, the confusing state of Indian 
affairs restricted Paisano and the APC from making strong commitments to threats and 
projects. Paisano’s connections to the BIA, too, surely influenced his feelings toward the 
NCAI’s anti-BIA policy, for many Pueblo leaders and communities relied on and 
supported the continued assistance of the BIA. Thus, the leadership of Tafoya and then 
Paisano in many ways mirrored the transitions occurring in postwar America and Indian 
Country. 
 Over the following decade, the leadership of Martin Vigil began to change the 
policies and format of the APC. In 1952, the highly experienced Vigil, at the age of fifty-
six, accepted his election as chairman of the APC. Serving until 1955, he was reelected in 
1957, and ultimately filled the office until 1964. Born in 1896 in Tesuque, Vigil grew up 
in his home Pueblo as well as spending considerable periods of time in Anglo America. 
With only a limited education at St. Catherine’s Indian School in Santa Fe, Vigil spent 
his teenage years working on movie sets in Hollywood, in mines in Cerrillos, New 
Mexico, and on rail yards in New Mexico and Colorado.225 In 1912, at the age of only 
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sixteen or seventeen, Vigil began attending APC meetings.226 He remembered that during 
this time, there was “hardly any cooperation with the Bureau of Indian Affairs.” In fact 
Pueblo elders were “suspicious of the BIA and the government.”227
 Vigil had been elected chairman of the APC before 1952, but had declined the 
position. In 1927, Vigil rejected his nomination as he was insecure about his ability to 
articulate himself proficiently in English. He was selected again in 1938, but once more 
declined the position, citing his lack of education. He felt that Pueblo men who had gone 
to college, or at least completed high school, would be more intellectually qualified than 
he was to govern the APC, given the need for the chairman to communicate with 
outsiders.228 Despite his lack of education, Vigil was continually active in Pueblo affairs. 
After tearing down the fence posts at Tesuque and participating in the Bursum-bill 
struggle in the 1920s, Vigil established a long and fruitful relationship with Collier. Vigil 
traveled on Pueblo delegations to Washington, D.C., to Collier’s home near San 
Francisco, and to New York to highlight the land and religious struggles of the Pueblos. 
Once he assumed leadership of the APC, he carried with him forty years of experience 
with the confederate council and a vast experience of working with outsiders. 
 Vigil’s tenure as APC chairman coincided with the most dangerous federal 
legislation of the twentieth century: the termination policies of the early 1950s. 
Beginning in 1953, federal Indian policy under President Dwight D. Eisenhower became 
“rigorously aimed at quickly assimilating Indians into American society” by terminating 
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the trusteeship of the federal government over Native American tribes.229 The 
Eisenhower administration installed a commissioner of Indian affairs who was keen to 
liquidate the federal government’s trusteeship of Indian tribes “just as rapidly as 
possible.”230 Glenn L. Emmons, a banker from Gallup, New Mexico, was previously 
known to the APC and the council did not support his nomination in 1953. At a meeting 
in January 1953 at Santo Domingo, the APC had officially backed the New Mexico State 
welfare director, Alva Simpson, for the position of commissioner. Simpson had promised 
the Pueblos a greater voice in their own government.231 Quite unsurprisingly, Emmons’s 
hostility toward tribal organizations made him a national “focal point of tribal criticism, 
as federal-Indian rapport suffered.”232 Vigil remembered this period as “when everything 
was going haywire.”233
 Termination represented a severe threat to the existence of the Pueblos as tribal 
and political entities. Wikinson deems the midcentury attack on tribes “a relentless 
political oppression.”234 Termination began in earnest when Congress passed House 
Concurrent Resolution 108 in 1953 and continued with a series of measures to end the 
federal responsibility towards all Native American tribes. In line with his policy of 
cooperating with outsiders, Vigil made a conscious effort to build a relationship between 
the APC and Emmons, who promised Vigil a policy of transparency regarding the 
government’s intentions. When the federal government proposed Public Law 280 and the 
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so-called Competency and Malone bills as part of the drive towards termination, Vigil 
accused Emmons of backtracking on his promise to consult the APC on all relevant 
matters. The APC vigorously opposed the measures.235 The Malone bill would have 
liquidated the BIA on a federal level, while Public Law 280 would have placed the 
Pueblos under state control. Along with the competency bill, Vigil labeled these 
proposals “the most ruinous in the black record of 150 years of broken promises by the 
federal government.”236 On 18 July 1953, the APC unanimously passed a resolution 
stating the Pueblos were “not yet ready” to exist without federal assistance. Vigil 
explained the APC’s opposition to Public Law 280, believing that the state of New 
Mexico was “not able to provide facilities for education, health and other Indian 
problems.”237 In January 1954, Vigil appealed to Emmons to “stand up and fight for 
us.”238
Motivated by the potentially destructive impact of termination, Vigil led the APC 
into a new era of Pueblo politics. Sando explains Vigil’s leadership philosophy as 
“cooperation for progress.”239 Vigil began routinely to invite outsiders to APC meetings 
so that federal, state, and BIA officials were aware of Pueblo issues. “They won’t come 
unless you invite them,” Vigil observed. He even established biannual meetings with 
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Apache and Navajo delegates from New Mexico. Vigil claimed the Pueblos had a number 
of “good friends that want to help . . . but we don’t let them know what is going on.” He 
said that council elders gradually accepted the growing APC cooperation with the BIA, 
Congress, the state government, and representatives of industry.240 As a result of Pueblo 
co-operation with the state of New Mexico during Gov. Edwin Mecham’s administration, 
1950–54 (and 1956–58), the state established the New Mexico Commission on Indian 
Affairs in 1955. Vigil invited Charles E. Minton, the Commission’s secretary, to APC 
meetings. According to Vigil, “he was a great big help . . . [and] everybody liked him.”241 
Vigil himself was named to the State Commission in 1955 as the influence of APC 
leadership grew into state politics.242
 Vigil was equally concerned that APC meetings should become a forum for 
political matters only—“outside of the religious, culture.”243 He feared that religious 
matters too often dominated APC meetings and hindered addressing crucial political 
issues. Vigil was in no way unsympathetic to religious and traditional matters, and did 
not want to “abolish” of “forget about it.”244 Indeed he himself had worked hard to 
protect the Pueblos’ right to dance in the 1920s. However, he believed that the APC 
should function as a “face to face” organization to address “business from outside.”245 He 
recalled that eventually, council members “all understood” that these measures were 
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necessary for the council to function effectively. Subsequently, the APC “never went 
back to tradition,” and focused solely on external political matters instead.246  
During Vigil’s leadership of the APC, he also proposed increasing the executive 
power of the chairman. Vigil announced to the APC, “I want for you people to give full 
authority to your chairman, if the bill come[s] up in Washington, good or bad, let the 
chairman speak to them and write a resolution on behalf of the All Pueblo Council.” Vigil 
was concerned that the protocol of APC meetings, which required prior organization and 
lengthy discussion, prevented communicating a Pueblo perspective to the nations capitol 
or state government on pending bills that affected the Pueblo way of life. Learning from 
the land controversy and termination policies, Vigil realized that, sometimes, the national 
and state political process moved quickly. “We have got to watch out,” he warned.247
As the APC joined the wider fight against termination, Vigil counted on the 
cooperation of supporting organizations to protect Pueblo interests. The NMAIA—once a 
relative foe to the APC—provided the APC with legal counsel to deflect the most 
harmful aspects of termination.248 More importantly, the NCAI then invited the APC to 
an “Emergency Conference” to discuss the federal termination policies in February 1954. 
Forty-three tribes were represented at the emergency summit in Washington, D.C. On 27 
February, Vigil spoke on behalf of the APC and denounced the government’s plans for 
termination.249 Despite the opposition to termination, however, the federal government 
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terminated the tribal status of over one hundred tribes nationwide. Yet the tribal and 
inter-tribal resistance to termination and the logistical problems the government 
encountered while implementing the measures stopped Congress from terminating all 
Indian tribes. “Federal officials failed to comprehend the existing strength of Native 
American cultures,” says historian Donald Fixico.250 Organizations such as the APC and 
NCAI proved crucial in limiting the impact of these destructive reforms. It is impossible 
to know the tangible impact the APC had on the final outcome in the fight against 
termination measures. Vigil’s willingness to work with others and form a political bloc in 
opposition to termination, however, certainly contributed to the wider long-term defeat of 
these policies.  
 Despite Vigil’s collaborative philosophy, the APC’s cooperation with outside 
organizations, and the NCAI in particular, was conditional under his chairmanship. 
Rainer was the secretary of the APC during Vigil’s first term and was elected chairman in 
February 1955, serving two years in between Vigil’s two stretches. Rainer apparently put 
pressure on Vigil and the APC to accept an NCAI-written constitutional by-law that 
would have allowed the council to receive thousands of dollars in funding from the 
NCAI. Vigil felt that as a nonprofit organization this was not appropriate for the APC. 
Further, he claimed that the NCAI intended to manipulate the strength of the APC for 
wider, pan-Indian causes: “they want to use all our [APC] rights and our help and our 
authority and our power.” Vigil even accused Rainer of running the APC with NCAI 
money.  
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 The Vigil-Rainer relationship was strained, and the issue of APC cooperation with 
the NCAI was evidently a sticking point. Still, Vigil remarked that he considered Rainer 
his “son.” “We got along alright,” he said, “but I am against the NCAI.”251 While Paisano 
had been reluctant to defer to the NCAI because of their hostility toward the BIA, Vigil 
considered the NCAI an organization that represented Indians who had been more 
explicitly affected by nineteenth-century removal and reservation policies. Whereas New 
Mexico’s Pueblos remained in their (reduced) homelands and maintained much of their 
sovereignty and tradition, the NCAI concentrated less on protecting traditional cultural 
values than finding a role for Indians within America. This distinction led him to 
conclude, “I don’t know what kind of culture you [the NCAI] have and if they are [real] 
Indians [sic].”252 Ultimately, Vigil wasn’t willing to concede any measure of APC 
sovereignty to a national organization—Indian or otherwise. 
On one occasion during Rainer’s chairmanship, Zuni Pueblo asked the APC to 
mediate a factional dispute at the same time that an NCAI meeting was scheduled in 
Washington, D. C. Rainer opted to go to Washington, while Vigil remained determined 
to aid his Zuni brothers settle the disagreement. He told Rainer, “You promised those 
people down there at Zuni, they need your help, they need our help.” And despite 
suffering from stomach ulcers and arthritis, Vigil traveled to Zuni alone, listened to each 
side’s grievances, and offered his counsel until 2 AM, when he helped resolve the dispute. 
Shortly after this event occurred, Vigil was re-elected chairman over Rainer and presided 
over the council for another six years. 253 While Vigil was often a willing inter-tribal 
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delegate and Pueblo representative, then, he remained committed to Pueblo-related 
problems and to maintaining the sovereignty of the APC. 
 In 1960, the Eisenhower administration brought its drive toward Indian 
assimilation to Santa Fe, initiating the closure of Santa Fe Indian School (SFIS). Sending 
Pueblo children to SFIS “had become a time-honored custom, especially among the 
Pueblos north of Santa Fe.” Vigil vehemently opposed the proposal to replace the school 
with a new Institute of American Indian Art (IAIA). By the 1950s, half of the SFIS staff 
were local Indians. The school provided the Pueblo community both a place of education 
for its children, and “a well-established network of communication with parents and 
tribal officials.” The APC lay at the center of this network.254 Vigil wanted Pueblo 
children eventually to be incorporated into the public school system, yet IAIA provided 
only a specialized education and was aimed at a national catchment area, leaving Pueblo 
(and other Indian) children in New Mexico without a local secondary school. He was not 
opposed to adding an art institute to SFIS, but felt there was still a real need to maintain 
SFIS. Vigil appreciated the vocational skills Pueblo children learned at SFIS, noting that 
after graduating from SFIS, “these boys can do anything, like painting, carpentry, driving 
tractors.” Vigil labeled SFIS a “real darn good school” and it indeed produced many 
university-educated Indians who rose to positions of authority within Indian Country in 
the twentieth century—including Vigil’s successor.255
 The proposed IAIA divided both the Pueblo and non-Indian community, and Vigil 
found only limited support in his objections to the project. Even those who had once 
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cooperated with him disagreed with Vigil’s stance. Collier, for example, stated that 
despite his “affection and a high regard for Martin Vigil, reaching from 40 years ago to 
the present,” Vigil’s opposition to IAIA was “unwise.”256 Similarly, Charles Elkus, a 
California lawyer who aided the Pueblos in the 1920s as part of the AIDA, supported the 
IAIA. Vigil appealed to Elkus: “Indian children need to learn how to read, write and 
speak English . . . they don’t need and don’t want a fancy art school . . . We need Santa 
Fe Indian School. We need education.”257 Sally Hyer, a historian of SFIS, found that 
Vigil had “difficulty obtaining consensus of Pueblo governors” because “some were 
negotiating with county school boards for public schools on Indian lands” and others 
apparently backed the integration of Indian students into public schools straight away.258 
Vigil even appealed to Indian Commissioner Philleo Nash to no avail.259 Ultimately, 
Vigil could not stop the tide of momentum and in the fall of 1962, SFIS was closed and 
the new IAIA was established in its place. SFIS students had to transfer to public schools 
or to Albuquerque Indian School, sixty miles away. 260  
 Shortly afterward, at the end of 1964, Vigil lost his battle for re-election as APC 
chairman for the last time. Vigil had based his stewardship of the APC and Pueblo 
politics on cooperation. His failure to obtain a consensus among the Pueblos and others in 
New Mexico on retaining SFIS, he believed, led to his failure to secure reelection. “I 
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have been a lonely man ever since,” he remembered, “‘cause nobody backed me, just a 
few Indians.”261  
 Wilkinson astutely observes that at midcentury, tribal leaders were largely 
ineffective at dealing with American society. Similarly, he points out that tribal action 
was still largely reactive at this time. Importantly, however, “ineffective or not, Indian 
people did resist.”262 As APC chairman, Vigil had a keen awareness of and dedication to 
the history and tradition of Tesuque Pueblo, the Tewa family, and the Pueblo community 
as a whole. Vigil appreciated that to maintain strength, the APC had to modernize. Yet he 
remained wary of implementing institutional changes, as he did not wish to compromise 
Pueblo tradition. He attempted to negotiate tradition and modernity for New Mexico’s 
nineteen Pueblos, while he pushed for a cautious but deliberate policy of cooperation for 
progress. Through all of his actions, he first and foremost protected Pueblo interests and, 
most importantly, he continually advocated inter-Pueblo cooperation. In the twentieth 
century, Indian Country relied on pragmatic leaders to direct tribal politics and negotiate 
with outsiders. And while Tafoya, Paisano, and Vigil did not always achieve their aims, 
the APC negotiated the tough conditions of the midcentury. Their combined effort meant 
that when Vigil left office for the last time and made way for Domingo Montoya of 
Sandia, he had established a template for the next generation of Pueblo leadership. Vigil 
negotiated and protected the Pueblos from federal termination, and further confirmed the 
essential role the APC played in maintaining Pueblo tradition while negotiating with the 
outside world. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The All Indian Pueblo Council and Self-Determination: Civil Rights, Economic 
Opportunity, and Educational Autonomy, 1962–1975 
 
 On 16 October 1965, representatives of the nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico, 
Sen. Joseph Montoya, and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Philleo Nash gathered at 
Santa Domingo Pueblo, New Mexico, to witness the signing of the first written 
constitution of the AIPC.263 The document formalized North America’s oldest 
confederation, the political wing of the Pueblos, and indicated the future direction of the 
council. The constitution also articulated the continued independence of the confederate 
council and the solidarity between nineteen tribes who were still overcoming the 
destructive period of the mid-twentieth century. The AIPC’s decision to sign a 
constitution in 1965 was indicative of the council’s will to extend the self-determination 
of the Pueblos in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
While the AIPC evolved throughout the twentieth century, from the 1950s to the 
1970s in particular, the AIPC began assuming more responsibilities and greater control of 
Pueblo life, becoming the most important element of Pueblo government in Pueblo 
negotiations with outside organizations. The AIPC utilized its historic and evolving 
relationship with the federal government to battle the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act and 
protect Pueblo sovereignty, to capitalize on federal War on Poverty funds, and to wrest 
control of Pueblo education in New Mexico away from the BIA and into Pueblo hands. In 
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all its negotiations, the AIPC was keen to protect the unique traditions and customs of its 
peoples and it often lobbied for the Pueblos through a conviction based on their historic 
independence from non-Indian society.  
The election of Domingo Montoya to the chairmanship of the APC in 1964 
generated further ingenuity in and evolution of the council. And while Vigil had 
negotiated with a federal government and an Indian Office hostile to tribal authority, 
Montoya could count on a relatively cooperative federal government that was gradually 
discarding the policies of termination and providing new opportunities to Native 
communities. In Montoya the AIPC had a chairman who battled tirelessly to build the 
council into an influential and powerful institution that could effectively serve the 
Pueblos’ interests on local, regional, and national levels. 
The middle of the twentieth century “marked the all-time low” for the “tribal 
existence” of Native Americans.264 Not only did the federal government attack the 
sovereignty of Indian nations, but this attack left Indian communities impoverished, ill-
educated, and unhealthy. Native Americans were expected to live twenty-five less years 
than the average American, while unemployment on some reservations pushed 90 
percent.265 The situation on Pueblo homelands was not as desperate as many places in the 
country. By 1964, 74 percent of the Pueblos nearly twenty thousand population still lived 
in their Pueblos. Of the total Pueblo population in cities and on reservations, 28 percent 
of Pueblos were unemployed.266 In the villages, unemployment ranged from 24–31 
percent. Vlasich estimates that three-quarters of Pueblo workers remained farmers. Still, 
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compared to wider America, the Pueblos faced a battle from birth to achieve economic 
and educational parity. By the end of the 1950s, the federal government was softening its 
approach to Native tribes. And in 1961, Congress approved Philleo Nash—an 
anthropologist opposed to the idea of termination—as commissioner of Indian affairs. 
Despite signs that federal policy was moving away from termination, however, it was not 
until the very end of the 1960s that Congress officially renounced the destructive policy.  
Within, but not because of, this slight vacuum of Congressional policy toward 
Indians grew a modern tribal sovereignty movement. Historians Daniel M. Cobb and 
Loretta Fowler have suggested recently that Native institutions working on practical 
solutions at tribal, intertribal, regional, and national levels played a crucial role in 
revitalizing Native communities and heartlands. By the mid-1960s, Native American 
leaders such as Montoya had vowed to end termination, battle to uphold treaty rights, and 
establish tribes as sovereign nations within reservations.267 Thus, while the Pueblos’ story 
after the midcentury was in many ways unique—when compared to tribes who suffered 
greater cultural destruction—this story should be understood in the context of a national 
movement for tribal sovereignty. 
As was the case with the council’s chairmen so often in the twentieth century, 
Montoya was the most pivotal component of the APC during this period. Montoya’s 
background as both a prominent member of Sandia Pueblo and as a citizen of U.S. 
society equipped him with the tools to negotiate effectively on the Pueblos behalf. 
Montoya was born on 5 August 1911, and was educated at Santa Fe Indian School 
through the eleventh grade. Like Vigil, Montoya experienced life outside his home 
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Pueblo and worked in the agricultural fields of South Dakota at the age of eighteen. 
When Montoya returned to Sandia, he worked on his family’s farm and spent some time 
trapping coyotes in the Sandia mountain foothills and the Rio Grande valley. He later 
devoted fifteen years to the United States Soil Conservation Service before he withdrew 
his retirement funds to set up his own farm at Sandia. He was elected chairman of the 
APC in February 1964.268
One of the first measures Montoya tackled as chairman was to oversee the 
ratification of the AIPC constitution that had been drawn up under Vigil’s leadership. As 
the frequency of Montoya’s trips to Washington, D. C., increased, he believed that he 
needed to prove without doubt that the APC represented all nineteen Pueblos of New 
Mexico. Equally, Montoya felt that the Pueblos have a “common culture,” a “bond of 
friendship and a feeling of mutual destiny,” but that in the early 1960s, they had “begun 
to identify concrete approaches to the solution of our [common] problems.”269 The 
constitution was the logical formalization of the AIPC and a shared Pueblo vision of the 
future. 
After a series of drafted proposals, representatives of the nineteen Pueblos of New 
Mexico met at Santo Domingo Pueblo on 16 October 1965 to sign the All Indian Pueblo 
Council’s first written constitution. The preamble states that “By virtue of our sovereign 
rights as Pueblo Indians and in accordance with our ancient customs and laws,” the 
constitution aims to “promote justice and encourage the common welfare . . . foster the 
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social and economic advancement of all the Pueblo Indians . . . preserve and protect our 
common interests” and “inherent rights of self-government.”270
Present at the ceremony was Commissioner Nash, who remarked that the 
document would enable the “oldest deliberative body in the western world . . . to take full 
advantage of help to be had today from the Office of Economic Opportunity.”271 New 
Mexico senator Joseph Montoya, also present, declared “the writing and signing of a 
constitution is one of the supreme acts which a democratic people can perform,” and that 
the document represented “an extension of the long and honored history of the pueblo 
people.”272 Later reporting on the constitution, the New York Times claimed that it 
showed that the AIPC had “stepped more boldly and successfully into the twentieth 
century than any other regional alliance of Indians.”273 And according to Sharon O’Brien, 
a sociologist of tribal governments, the signing marked the AIPC’s transition into a 
“sophisticated administrative organization.”274
Despite the apparent success of the occasion and the assertion of AIPC power in 
the constitution, Pueblo sovereignty was already under threat in this period. In 1961 
North Carolina’s Democratic senator Sam Ervin, a segregationist and strict 
constructionist, headed a new congressional committee to investigate the position of 
individual civil rights on Indian reservations. By 1965 he had concluded that the 
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inconsistent and unspecified nature of the rights of Indians and non-Indians under tribal 
governments required federal attention and regulation. On 22 June 1965, hearings in 
Congress opened on the Ervin bills, which threatened to restrict tribal sovereignty all over 
Indian Country. The AIPC, spearheaded by Montoya, led the defense of Pueblo  
sovereignty in Washington, D. C., over the next few years. The AIPC was ultimately 
unsuccessful in blocking the legislation, which passed in 1968, but the council won some 
key concessions that protected many aspects of Pueblo tradition. 275
The core of Ervin’s measures were the sweeping proposals of bill S. 961. The 
legislation stated that “any Indian tribe in exercising its powers of local self-government 
shall be subject to the same limitations and restraints as those which are imposed on the 
Government of the United States by the United States Constitution.”276 In the United 
States, the 1960s were, in many ways, characterized by a continual struggle by ethnic 
minorities in the Civil Rights movement to attain equality. Ervin and many officials in 
the federal government failed to comprehend that Native people did not necessarily want 
equality. To many tribes, sovereignty was the ultimate goal; securing it required battling 
Congress and the state and federal courts.277
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Ervin’s proposals had the potential to strip all tribal governments of their 
sovereign rights and posed practical questions about how tribes could afford to extend the 
Bill of Rights to their people. Most importantly for the AIPC were the federal stipulations 
for tribes to establish a jury system and provide legal counsel to all defendants. At the 
opening hearing, chairman Montoya of the AIPC and Executive Director Vine Deloria Jr. 
of the NCAI, protested most fervently against the Ervin bills. Montoya believed that “if 
enacted into law, the legislation would bar the effective administration of the tribal 
government.” On 22 June 1965, the AIPC passed a resolution that rejected five of the 
eight bills put forward by Ervin. The AIPC protest represented by far the greatest 
opposition to the measures heard in Congress. Significantly, Montoya declared that 
“traditional means of tribal justice should be continued,” and obviously saw the proposals 
as an infringement on the power of each Pueblo to govern its own people and regulate 
their customs. 278 Following on Montoya, Deloria Jr. echoed many of his sentiments but 
did not oppose as many measures: the NCAI approved of many of the measures as they 
would modify Public Law 280. 
When the amended Ervin bill returned in 1968, AIPC opposition to S. 961 had 
forced the senator to embrace a crucial change that accommodated Pueblo tradition. 
Ervin deleted the establishment clause of the first amendment from the Indian Bill of 
Rights. Native governments would be free to promote their tribal religion. According to 
legal historian John Wunder, this alteration was a direct response to the AIPC’s appeal 
for their right to theocratic independence.279 Despite considerable changes to Ervin’s 
proposals, tribes would still be obliged to provide legal counsel to all defendants and 
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introduce a system of trial by jury. During the hearings in March 1968, most tribes were 
apparently satisfied by Ervin’s revisions; only the Pueblos continued to object to the 
act.280 Their unique history informed Pueblo resistance to the Ervin measures. The 
Pueblos had generally dodged intrusions into their political structure under U.S. rule. The 
Indian Bill of Rights of 1968 may not have been interpreted as particularly threatening 
legislation to many tribes, especially when compared to the termination policies of the 
1940s and 1950s. For the Pueblos, who had avoided the destructive impact of 
termination, the Ervin measures were an unprecedented trespass on traditional Pueblo 
sovereignty, which was unique in North America. 
Reminiscent of APC action in 1922, the council organized an all-Pueblo 
delegation to fight Senator Ervin’s proposals. The Congressional hearings in March 1968 
were dominated by speeches from Pueblo representatives. No less than thirteen Pueblo 
leaders were present in Washington (nine of them speaking), and Montoya was the first 
witness to be heard.  He declared, “As you can well understand by the attendance of the 
Pueblo leaders present in this room, we consider these bills to be one of the . . . most 
important measures confronting Indian people for the past several years.” Under an AIPC 
resolution passed on 23 March 1968, he argued that the Pueblos were in a unique 
historical position in North America, and requested that all Pueblos be excluded from the 
provisions of Title I and Title II of the Ervin bills. Montoya stated that the “traditional 
[Pueblo] way of life did not break down and disappear like that of most tribal groups.” 
The AIPC considered the measures of the Ervin bills “highly objectionable,” because 
they “tend to eliminate our traditional ways of attaining the basic objectives of justice and 
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equality.” Montoya explained that Pueblo social structures already affirmed the spirit of 
freedom in the Bill of Rights but believed that the practical implications of the proposed 
legislation had the potential to destroy the Pueblo way of life.281
The Ervin Bill was nonetheless signed into law a month later in April 1968. The 
AIPC, however, remained defiant: “No federal agency is going to tell the Pueblos exactly 
how their governments should be organized. This is a matter each Pueblo must decide for 
itself.” The council lobbied its U.S. senators, Joseph Montoya and Clinton P. Anderson, 
for a bill that would exclude them from the objectionable measures of the Civil Rights 
Act.282 Senator Anderson told the AIPC to “keep on with what you are doing.” He would 
“seek an amendment to the bill exempting Indian pueblos from the portions affecting 
Indians.”283 Subsequently, Montoya and Anderson introduced bill S. 211 (and S. 2173) in 
Congress. Because of the Pueblo-specific nature of Anderson and Montoya’s proposed 
amendments, Ervin and his committee held the hearings in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 
on 11 April 1969 to hear further Pueblo testimony. This time the Pueblos were joined by 
prominent Mescalero Apache leader Wendell Chino, who was connected closely to 
Pueblo leadership at this time. The Jicarilla Apache and Navajo tribes also submitted 
written statements that supported the Pueblo position. Indeed the APC’s influence on 
these tribes transformed their opinions on the matter from general agreement to 
opposition. 
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At this hearing, Montoya restated his concerns that the 1968 Indian Civil Rights 
Act would “destroy the traditions . . . greatly weaken our governments,” and “impose 
financial burdens” on the Pueblos.284 When questioned directly by Senator Ervin, 
Montoya was increasingly adamant that the Pueblos deserved exclusion because of their 
historic political autonomy: “What happens to our sovereign rights, then? As you 
remember, people, any community anywhere, cannot live for hundreds of years under 
any system if the system is wrong for the people or for the community.”285 Legal 
historian Donald Burnett observed that the Pueblos were “obstinate . . . when faced with 
the possibility of change imposed from the outside.”286 Led by the AIPC, the nineteen 
Pueblos put up an extremely robust defense of their historic sovereignty, arguing that 
their threatened traditions, now under federal threat, gave legitimacy to their governments 
and to the political and social organization of their communities.  
This Pueblo defiance compelled Ervin to introduce two amendments to the Indian 
Bill of Rights, though he refused to exclude the Pueblos from the act altogether. To the 
dismay of the AIPC, these amendments were never ratified by the senate, all but ending 
the AIPC’s defense of Pueblo sovereignty in this instance. The show of inter-Pueblo unity 
led by the AIPC during this period, however, undoubtedly legitimized the work of the 
council as an organized and powerful political institution. Individual Pueblos were rallied 
to defend their interests, Senators Anderson and Montoya fought for the Pueblo cause and 
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formed good relationships with the AIPC, and the federal government in Washington, D. 
C., continually praised the AIPC for its well-orchestrated campaign.  
In the 1970s the federal government interpreted the impact of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act on tribal sovereignty. Juliana Martinez of Santa Clara Pueblo bought a suit 
against her governor and Pueblo council, alleging that the Pueblo’s (gendered) 
membership ordinance went against the equal protection provision of the Civil Rights 
Act. In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, and held in 
favor of the Pueblo. The court concluded that, despite the Indian Civil Rights Act’s 
attempt to regulate tribal sovereignty, the Federal government should not interfere with 
the Pueblo’s “tribal autonomy and self-government.” In his analysis of the case, Vieno 
Lindstrom states that the APC’s criticism of the Indian Civil Rights Act helped the court 
decide in favor of tribal power. In many ways, Martinez strengthened the ability of 
Pueblo councils to govern their own affairs and thus limited the potentially intrusive 
elements of the Indian Civil Rights Act.287
The political wrangling around the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act only constituted 
a small volume of the total energies of the AIPC during this period however. While 
defending Pueblo sovereignty, the AIPC also attempted to achieve economic self-
sufficiency and to improve the economic situation of all nineteen Pueblos. When 
Montoya was elected chairman in 1964, the AIPC had neither a central office nor any 
means of income. Montoya almost immediately remedied this situation by permanently 
moving the council to the central and urban location of Albuquerque. The AIPC had no 
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office, telephone, chair, or any infrastructure when this move occurred. So the BIA 
temporarily housed the council in the Southern Pueblos Agency building in Albuquerque. 
Once the AIPC had established its new central location, Montoya applied for funds from 
the Field Foundation to support the operations of the council for a year. The foundation, 
providing funds to organizations that promoted civil rights and social change, granted the 
AIPC nearly $25,000 in 1965 and the council received this support for the next few years. 
This money initially allowed the AIPC to pay its chairman $8,000 a year for his services, 
hire a secretary, maintain a telephone line, and subsidize travel costs. 288 Previously, 
AIPC chairmen had not been paid for their services and this change marked a shift in the 
efficiency of the organization. 
The Field Foundation money was crucial to facilitating the growth of the AIPC, 
but this money only supported the council itself, not the Pueblo people. After 1964, the 
AIPC was able to apply for new federal funds made available under President Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s War on Poverty programs. Johnson’s social policies of the 1960s aimed to 
curtail the economic decline of minorities and revitalize impoverished communities. 
Although they were not intended exclusively for Native communities, the newly 
established Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and Economic Development 
Administration (EDA) in particular, provided significant funds to tribes in the name of 
economic development over the next decade. These offices handed funds directly to 
tribes to administer on their own terms, sidestepping the paternalistic impulses and 
administrative red tape of the BIA. Cobb writes, “For the first time since the United 
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States colonized Native America, tribal governments administered programs for their 
own communities.”289  
Cobb explains that the War on Poverty became a “critical component of a new 
political dynamic in Indian Country,” and prompted a “nationalistic movement for tribal 
self-determination.”290 Historian and Native education specialist Margaret Connell-Szasz 
has pointed to the significance of tribal leaders during this same period. Tribal leaders 
became familiar with constructing a “convincing case for the needs of their people” and 
learned “where the sources of political power lay, and they began to go directly to these 
sources.”291 Using the opportunities made available by the War on Poverty, Montoya 
began utilizing the Pueblos’ historic and continually evolving relationship with the 
nation’s capitol to increase Pueblo self-determination.  
 The OEO administered various Head Start, Job Corps, VISTA, and Community 
Action Programs (CAP) within various impoverished Indian and, predominantly, non-
Indian communities. Each aimed to promote and invigorate economic development at the 
local level in a variety of ways. The AIPC and individual Pueblo governments 
implemented Head Start programs, directed at pre-school children, in a number of 
Pueblos. These were praised by Montoya for reversing trends and “breaking the tragic 
cycle of ever-receding goals by our Indian students.”292 The AIPC also employed Sophie 
Aberle to oversee a Computer Assisted Instruction program in Isleta Pueblo from 1970 
onwards, receiving $300,000 from the OEO in 1974 alone. An Indian CAP was 
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administered through the University of New Mexico. It was designed “to provide 
technical assistance for Indians in their efforts to better their social and economic 
condition.”293  
The AIPC also frequently faced frustration when dealing with the OEO. In 1965 
the council’s bid to secure funds for establishing an Arts and Crafts Guild was rejected by 
the OEO. Similarly, its attempts to lure industries onto Pueblo lands were often thwarted. 
In 1966 the OEO denied the AIPC funds for a Pueblo Indian Industrial Development and 
Marketing Demonstration Project. Montoya frequently encouraged industry to come onto 
Pueblo lands, taking a trip to New York City in March 1968 to address an industrial trade 
show organized by the EDA, OEO, and NCAI.294 Montoya believed that in order to 
facilitate the economic development of Pueblo communities, curb Pueblo migration to 
cities, and maintain cultural continuity, local employment opportunities were needed for 
Pueblo workers, “to find productive jobs without totally abandoning their traditional 
ways of life.”295 Montoya did negotiate an industrial contract on Pueblo lands, but he did 
so in his capacity as president of Sandia Indian Industries, Inc., in 1973. However, the 
funding for this project came from the Small Business Administration (SBA), which was 
not connected with War on Poverty programs.296  
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 The AIPC could also negotiate with a second federal administrative body under 
the War on Poverty in the 1960s. In 1965 Congress passed the Public Works and 
Economic Development Act establishing the Economic Development Administration 
under the secretary of commerce. The aim of the EDA was “primarily to fund public 
works projects” in impoverished communities.297 Unlike the OEO, the EDA had the 
mandate to distribute grants for Public Works and Development Facilities—or 
infrastructure crucial to economic development. Senator Joseph Montoya, good friend of 
the AIPC, was one of only a few congressmen supportive of the Public Works and 
Economic Development Act when it was drawn up in Congress. Montoya singled out the 
Indian communities of New Mexico as potential beneficiaries from the EDA, stating that 
“Acoma, Isleta, Laguna, Jemez, Jicarilla, Mescalero, Ramah, Santo Domingo, Zuni, 
Santa Clara, and Navajo” communities would benefit from its passing.298  
 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, federal cooperation, the support of Senator 
Montoya, and EDA funds combined to create a home and base for the AIPC’s economic 
and community development. Despite having its 1965 proposal for an Arts and Crafts 
Guild rejected by the OEO, the AIPC still aspired to establish a home for practical Pueblo 
training and a place to sell Pueblo goods. By the 1960s, the BIA-run Albuquerque Indian 
School (AIS) had fallen into a state of disrepair, and the BIA initiated plans for the 
eventual dissolution of the institution. As early as 1966 Montoya lobbied Secretary of the 
Interior Stuart Udall, and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Robert L. Bennett (Oneida) to 
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sign the land over to the council.299 And in June 1969, the BIA began what would 
become a pattern in the 1970s when it relinquished around 11.6 acres of AIS land to the 
AIPC. The land was “no longer needed for federal Indian School purposes,” and the BIA 
assigned the land to the nineteen Pueblos for a “school or other public purposes.”300 The 
AIPC took the unprecedented step of directly contacting President Richard M. Nixon to 
thank him for giving the Pueblos a “spot of land to call our own . . . to form [a] more 
cohesive organization which can work for the good of all the nineteen Indian Pueblo 
communities in New Mexico.”301
 The AIPC drew up proposals to utilize the land, located near the heart of 
downtown Albuquerque, for a modern all-Pueblo cultural center and immediately applied 
for EDA funds under the provisions for a Grant for Public Works and Development 
Facility. To enable the successful transfer of funds, tax free, the AIPC quickly acted to 
form a nonprofit organization under the state of New Mexico. At a meeting four days 
after the council was handed the Indian school land, the AIPC unanimously voted to form 
the “All-Indian Pueblo Council, Inc.,” to receive and administer the EDA funds.302 On 30 
June 1969, the AIPC signed the necessary Articles of Incorporation and the AIPC, Inc., 
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was established. The purpose of the organization was to “centralize [AIPC] efforts to 
advance [the] educational, economic, and social position of all the Pueblo Indians.”303  
 The AIPC simultaneously submitted proposals to the EDA for a Pueblo Cultural 
Center. It was hoped that the cultural center would act as a “central showplace for 
[Pueblo] culture and history,” via a museum, information center, arts and crafts 
workshops, sales rooms and outdoor theater. 304 Equally important was the hope that the 
cultural center would provide “an opportunity for potential Indian leaders to acquire the 
skill and experience needed to develop business enterprises on their own reservations.”305 
The hopes for the IPCC were ambitious. Not only would the nineteen Pueblos have an 
inter-Pueblo home, but their unity evident in the facility would provide economic support 
to the tens of thousands of Pueblo people in New Mexico. 
 The battle to secure this facility was far from straightforward. Over two years 
after initial plans were submitted, the council had to overcome a zoning restriction 
attached to all EDA grants. Bernalillo County, the location of the proposed IPCC, was 
not zoned as a community eligible for EDA funds. After a great deal of negotiation on the 
part of Senator Montoya, the EDA re-designated the AIPC’s 11.6 acres ‘Restricted Indian 
Land’ to fulfill the relevant EDA requirements. Further problems arose when the AIPC’s 
ambitious plans for a traditional Pueblo-style building and business center increased 
construction costs to $2.4 million. 306 Perhaps more importantly, some members of the 
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Denver office of the EDA were not convinced that all nineteen Pueblos supported the 
project, and funds were withheld until the EDA was satisfied that the AIPC had the full 
support of all nineteen Pueblos. The AIPC scaled back plans for the IPCC, and Senator 
Montoya pushed the EDA to endorse the revisions. In June 1972, the EDA approved a 
grant of $1,640,000 for the IPCC—the cost of the entire facility.307  
Despite further delays, construction of the IPCC went ahead and on 28 August 
1976, seven years after it was initially proposed, the AIPC invited Senator Montoya to 
open the newly completed center. Montoya declared that the IPCC would be “another 
piece in the growing economic development of the Indian Pueblos . . . a beacon for the 
future as well as a place for reverence for the past.”308 The EDA had become infamous 
for the political and bureaucratic squabbling that accompanied its grants. Even Domingo 
Montoya commented that AIPC enthusiasm for the EDA lagged as “everything became 
mired in the traditional bureaucratic red tape,” unlike the seemingly fluid funding from 
the OEO. 309  But the Pueblos benefited enormously from the hard work of the AIPC and 
Senator Montoya in negotiating the convoluted restrictions of EDA funds. Senator 
Montoya in particular became a close friend of the AIPC during this time and continually 
backed its initiatives. His cooperation with the AIPC and his position on the Senate 
appropriations committee were vital to the success of the IPCC project. 
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The EDA spent only $150 million on Indian projects between 1966 and 1975, 
making the AIPC’s grant of $1,640,000 all the more remarkable.310 The EDA’s grant 
built a permanent home for the AIPC on its very own, semi-sovereign, 11.6 acres of all-
Pueblo land in central Albuquerque and facilitated a new era of economic development 
for Pueblo people and businesses.  
 During the time the AIPC was striving to establish itself economically, it was also 
working to improve the educational circumstances of the Pueblo people. Since the 1870s, 
the BIA had managed federal Indian education. In the 1960s and 1970s, the AIPC began 
to wrestle gradually from the BIA its control of Pueblo education. Significantly, the 
AIPC did not overtly reject BIA assistance and was actually keen to maintain a close 
relationship with the bureau. In so doing, the AIPC used the BIA to establish its own 
local forums of power. By 1968, for instance, the AIPC had coordinated Advisory School 
Boards at each of the twelve BIA schools on Pueblo lands, “greatly increase[ing] the 
participation of Pueblo members in making the decisions that affect their children.”311 
And in 1965, the BIA proposed the construction of a new $13 million Indian-only high 
school to replace the deteriorating Albuquerque Indian School. The AIPC was quick to 
realize the potential for the Pueblo community in such a project, and after negotiations 
with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs Philleo Nash, the AIPC amended a plan to the 
proposals that a substantial section of the school be designated as a “much needed post-
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high school vocational and technical education” facility for “Indian youth in the 
Southwest.”312  
 Domingo Montoya was adamant that a technical vocational facility was necessary 
because Pueblo students were neglected in public schools and consequently missed out 
on the opportunity to attend institutions of higher education.313 Montoya damningly 
suggested that public schools “thwart [Pueblo] desires without giving us anything in 
return,” claiming that because of the compensation public schools received for enrolling 
Indian students, they were only “interested in money.” Further, Montoya argued that 
public schools essentially segregated Indian students “in fact,” if not intentionally.314 The 
president of the New Mexico Federation of Teachers, Thord C. Nilson, agreed with 
Montoya, stating that there was a “tragic de facto segregation of a great majority of 
Indian pupils” and that a technical vocational facility was necessary “to meet [the] special 
needs” of Indian pupils let down by public schools.315 Once the AIPC’s plan for a post-
high school technical facility was announced, the project gained the support of many 
sections of Indian and non-Indian Albuquerque society. The previous BIA plan to replace 
AIS directly had been hugely unpopular among residents of the Albuquerque community. 
In particular, opponents wanted to end the institutional segregation of Indian students.316
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The council hoped to re-establish a degree of Pueblo control over its students’ 
education through its negotiations with the BIA. Because of the AIPC’s revisions, plans 
quickly evolved calling for the creation of a separate and brand new higher-education 
institution administered by the BIA but, crucially, governed by a coalition of New 
Mexican Indian interests, including the Pueblos. Senators Montoya and Anderson lobbied 
Congress on behalf of New Mexico’s Native communities and the Senate appropriated 
$13 million for the project in 1966. 
During the late 1960s, Native communities throughout the United States began 
pushing for native-controlled higher-education institutions. According to Connell-Szasz, 
tribal colleges are “committed to the communities they serve” and are “responsive to 
local needs.”317 This sensitivity to the local community is partly due to organizations 
such as the AIPC, which planned innovatively for the needs of the local Indian 
community while they cooperated with outside organizations such as the BIA. In 1971, 
the Southwestern Indian Polytechnic Institute (SIPI) was established on Albuquerque’s 
west mesa, on lands that had once served as the AIS dairy farm. Three years earlier, the 
Navajos opened the first tribal college in the United States in Arizona.318 Crucially for 
the AIPC, their negotiations with the BIA in the planning of SIPI brought a degree of 
Pueblo control over Indian youth and allowed the council to establish itself as a body 
with political influence in the Albuquerque area.  
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Whether the AIPC was ultimately successful in regaining a semblance of control 
over Pueblo education through SIPI, however, is rather unclear. Almost immediately, and 
in the context of similar protests across America in the 1970s, SIPI became a “hotbed of 
student discontent.” 319 Native educators were apparently not consulted on course 
curriculum and the BIA essentially controlled the direction of the college. Campus unrest 
culminated in 1975, when forty students from SIPI joined twenty-five members of AIM 
to occupy sections of the college in an attempt to assert Native control over the 
institution. Apparently indignant, and feeling challenged by an outside organization 
“speaking on behalf of the AIPC,” then chairman Delphin Lovato of Ohkay Owingeh 
Pueblo told AIM to “stay the hell out of here.” 320 The AIPC’s experience with SIPI was 
an early venture in establishing Pueblo influence over the education of its children, but 
the enterprise was by no means a success. Despite upheaval at SIPI, however, the council 
gained invaluable experience in planning with the BIA and preparing for further control 
of Pueblo education. 
One of the cornerstones of the AIPC’s education committee policies during the 
1960s and 1970s was its emphasis on the importance of higher education for Pueblo 
people. In 1969, the council took control of the BIA’s Pueblo scholarship program. 
Higher-education enrollment numbers subsequently “began to skyrocket.” By the end of 
1974, around six hundred Pueblo students were receiving AIPC scholarships.321 Once 
more, the AIPC was able to prize a degree of control away from the BIA and establish 
greater influence over the education of Pueblo children. 
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In 1975, recognizing the changing tide of Indian self-determination, Congress 
passed the American Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. This act 
opened up to Native communities an array of new opportunities. The legislation enabled 
tribes to apply for federal funds to administer tribal programs on reservations. 
Significantly, the Self-Determination Act, along with other 1970s legislation for 
American Indians, marked the final end of termination and began to reinvigorate the 
tribal structures.322 Taking advantage of the new legislation, the AIPC took further steps 
to control Pueblo education by successfully contracting the running of Albuquerque 
Indian School in 1977. Using Public Law 93-638 of the self-determination act, the AIPC 
became the “first tribal organization to take on direct responsibility and control of a 
Bureau [of Indian Affairs] school.” 323And, in 1981, when the Albuquerque Indian 
School was eventually decommissioned, the AIPC moved the school to Santa Fe, New 
Mexico, and reestablished Santa Fe Indian School at the expense of the IAIA.324
By the early twenty-first century, the AIPC-administered SFIS was a model of 
success in New Mexico and admired across Indian Country. In 2005 the AIPC unveiled 
the school’s new $50 million building complex to its seven hundred students. The 
graduation rate is nearly 100 percent and 80 percent of graduates go on to higher 
education. In 1976 Chairman Del Lovato placed Joseph Abeyta of Santa Clara Pueblo in 
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charge of the school. Abeyta contined to lead the school into the new millennium. In 
2000, President William J. Clinton transferred the SFIS land to the AIPC, giving the 
council another area of sovereign, all-Pueblo land in an urban area.325 The AIPC’s 
struggles to influence Pueblo education were not always successful, but in the 1960s and 
1970s the council gradually displaced the BIA as the chief administrator of Pueblo 
education and increased tribal control of the education of their children.  
By 1971, Domingo Montoya had served the maximum term of six years allowed 
any AIPC chairman, and Benny Atencio (Santo Domingo) was elected as his 
replacement. In the mid 1970s, chairman Del Lovato reorganized the AIPC. The council 
had grown into “an enterprise with over two hundred employees and a budget of $6 
million.”326 So Lovato reorganized the council to focus on lobbying at the state level, to 
take advantage of its growing regional influence. The council then began publishing a 
newspaper and broadcasting a Pueblo radio station as part of the plans of its new 
communications committee.327
In the mid to late twentieth century, then, the AIPC acted as an inter-Pueblo 
vehicle that provided New Mexico’s nineteen Pueblos with a vociferous voice during a 
tumultuous but occasionally optimistic period of time. Despite many setbacks, such as the 
ultimate passage of the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, the Pueblos were able to reassert 
control over their childrens’ education and extend their economic self-sufficiency through 
the AIPC. By mobilizing politically via the AIPC, inter-Pueblo unity protected elements 
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of Pueblo sovereignty and thus maintained a degree of continuity of tradition. The AIPC 
understood the Indian Civil Rights Act as an attack on the Pueblos’ right to self-
government within nineteen small communities in New Mexico. The AIPC then took full 
advantage of the changing federal commitment to tribes by transferring economic 
opportunities into institutions that helped the Pueblos increase their sovereign rights. 
Further, the AIPC became the first Indian institution to use the Self-determination Act to 
administer a school and thus begin controlling Pueblo education. The importance of 
Indians educating their own is noted by Della Warrior (Otoe-Missouria), who states that 
the “survival of our communities and of our respective cultures” depends on the “control 
of the education of our young people.”328
“The Indian revival of the second half of the twentieth century,” writes 
Wilkinson, “deserves to be recognized as a major episode in American history.”329 
Native American leaders such as Vigil and Montoya helped the Pueblos to survive the 
menacing atmosphere of the mid-century and then flourish during the 1960s and 1970s. 
As demonstrated here, the movement for modern tribal sovereignty was not particularly 
eye-catching. The AIPC had few high profile moments on which to hinge their fight to 
increase their sovereignty. Instead, the AIPC relied on their constitution, which itself was 
based on decades of activism, as a practical guideline to articulate their plight and to 
change its course. Despite fighting in the political darkness, Native American institutions 
such as the AIPC achieved great success in the mid-to-late twentieth century in protecting 
tribal cultures and increasing their ability to negotiate for themselves. This success is 
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particularly remarkable considering how relatively few people the APC represented, on a 
national level. In 1911, the AIPC wrote, “We have organized into a federation of tribes 
and have had there [sic] meetings which have resulted in a great good to us all. We study 
our condition from every point of view and we believe we have inaugurated a new 
upward movement which all New Mexico, white and Indian, will feel.”330 Some sixty 
years later, the AIPC could feel some satisfaction that their movement for sovereignty 
had, indeed, been felt across New Mexico. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Today, the AIPC continues to represent the nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico, and 
beyond. The organization has added considerably to its responsibilities to the Pueblo 
people, further widening its scope of operations. In April 2006, the AIPC’s new, for-
profit wing, The Indian Pueblos Federal Development Corporation, completed the 
construction of the Pueblo Center Business Complex on the old AIS land adjacent to the 
IPCC. In an ironic twist, the AIPC-owned building now hosts some Albuquerque offices 
of the BIA, reversing the historic roles of tenant and landlord.331 The AIPC has also 
recently been mired in controversy over their decision to destroy the old buildings at 
Santa Fe Indian School in July 2008. Responding to critics who resented the decision to 
tear down such a historically rich structure, an SFIS spokesman said merely that the 
school was exercising its “sovereign authority.”332 And on 19 November 2009, the AIPC 
welcomed a new Pueblo into its organization: Ysleta del Sur Pueblo of El Paso, Texas. 
The people of Ysleta del Sur had previously left the northern Rio Grande Valley during 
the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, when displaced Tiguas retreated south with the Spanish. By 
re-embracing the Ysleta de Sur, the AIPC was in many ways completing a political 
confederation that existed over three hundred and fifty years ago. 
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332 “Santa Fe Indian School Demolition Goes On, With Little Explanation,” Santa Fe 
New Mexican, 30 July 2008, 1. 
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 “Today if you go to visit a tribal headquarters,” writes Della Warrior, “you will 
see Indian people running their own governments in control of nearly all the services 
these provide. But it was not always that way.”333 When the AIPC began fighting against 
incursions onto their land in the 1910s, the very existence of a Pueblo land base was 
under threat and the Pueblos relied heavily on the Indian Office to maintain their 
economic and educational survival. Over the next sixty years, the AIPC fought a variety 
of battles on behalf of its Pueblo constituents in order to protect the continued 
sovereignty of the Pueblos to govern themselves. In the process, the AIPC began 
negotiating a place for the Pueblos to control aspects of their life. And while neither 
Pueblo nor American society remained static during this time, the Pueblo people 
increasingly charged the AIPC with participating actively in American political society, 
so that traditional elements of Pueblo life could continue. 
 The AIPC understood its many twentieth-century battles as threats to the historic 
sovereignty of the Pueblos. When planning on a course of action to approach land and 
water battles; threats to the validity of the AIPC; federally imposed policies including 
assimilation, the IRA, termination, and self-determination; through to economic 
development and educational independence, the AIPC’s first priority was protecting and 
extending the Pueblos’ right to govern themselves.  
 The story of the AIPC during this period is important because it helps us 
understand the wider narrative of the movement for tribal sovereignty in the twentieth 
century. Many histories have focused on the pan-Indian nature of Native American 
stories in the twentieth century. And while the AIPC is itself an inter-Pueblo 
 
333 Warrior, “Conclusion,” in Beyond Red Power, Cobb and Fowler, 292 
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organization, the aims of the council were tribal in nature. The AIPC thus illustrates how 
Indian institutions at this time did not necessarily abandon their tribal structure, and the 
Pueblos first and foremost considered themselves tribal Indians.  The AIPC’s resistance 
to assimilation, integration, and termination, then, was an assertion of the Pueblos’ right 
to represent themselves as sovereign, historic entities. Certainly the movement for tribal 
sovereignty that occurred throughout Indian Country had relied on inter-tribal 
cooperation. But the fact the AIPC was a part of this movement shows that inter-tribal 
cooperation did not mean surrendering a tribal identity.334  
 For the AIPC, their insistence on protecting their sovereign rights was based on 
their historic independence apart from American society. Yet AIPC leaders realized that 
in order to ensure the Pueblos could run their own affairs independently from the federal 
government, the AIPC had to negotiate for the Pueblos a space to function within 
America. Refusing to enter into dialogue with federal and state governments was simply 
not an option. Instead, mastering political negotiations and networks within Indian affairs 
and wider political circles proved the most effective use of AIPC energies. The AIPC 
often embraced non-Indian cooperation, as was the case with Collier. They also shunned 
those people and organizations they considered hostile to Pueblo sovereignty. Making 
these pragmatic choices within political networks increasingly allowed the AIPC to 
protect the Pueblos, until they were in a position to appropriate power once held by 
federally based institutions, and begin acting as a source of tribal power.  
 
334 For a more in-depth discussion of inter-tribalism in the twentieth century, see Kent 
Blansett, "A Journey to Freedom: The Life of Richard Oakes, 1942–1972" (PhD diss., 
University of New Mexico, 2011). 
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 Despite the importance of co-opting non-Indian interests in the twentieth century, 
the AIPC’s biggest concern, and its greatest strength, was maintaining and strengthening 
the unity of the Pueblos themselves. Certainly the Pueblos have historically engaged in 
long-terms conflicts between one another. In the twentieth century, however, the need to 
work in unison to fend off the threats of modern America necessitated that the Pueblos 
work together to find practical solutions to problems common to all. Within this time 
frame, the Pueblos were not always united on every issue within and between Pueblos. 
Yet the continued existence of the AIPC demonstrates that the Pueblos realized they must 
hold a sentiment of unity in order to protect the culture they held most dearly. The 
twentieth century story of the AIPC illuminates the continued tribal functioning of the 
Pueblos, their pragmatic approach in negotiations with outsiders, and their long-term 
fight to protect their historic sovereignty. 
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